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SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION WITHOUT CLASS
ACTIONS
David H. Webber*

In this Article, I imagine a post-class-action landscape for shareholder litigation.
Projecting an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class
actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms—most likely through the
adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions—I assess
what shareholder litigation would disappear, what (if any) would remain, and
what a post-class-action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class
action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional
investors from having to pursue positive-value claims against companies.
Currently, the class action effectively ratifies fund fiduciary passivity in the face of
fraud, for example, as long as the institution files a claim form to collect its share
of a class action settlement that has been judicially certified. But without the class
action, monitoring and litigation costs for such institutions may increase because
fund fiduciaries must monitor their portfolios for, and litigate, positive-value
claims. Failure to do so could expose them to liability to fund beneficiaries. I offer
some suggestive, but incomplete, evidence about how many funds will have
positive-value claims. Whether institutions in fact pursue such claims will
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decisively determine whether shareholder litigation has a post-class-action future.
I also argue that bizarre gaps in liability coverage for public-pension-fund
fiduciaries—who serve the funds that have traditionally been the most active
litigants—may have unpredictable effects on trustee behavior outside the class
action, may tilt in favor of bringing claims, and may also lead to herding behavior
in arbitration. I also assess how loss of the class action would affect plaintiff law
firms. I argue that the end of the class action means, at a minimum, abandonment
of the idea that investors should be compensated for losses due to fraud or other
corporate malfeasance. And I demonstrate that loss of the class action leaves
investors in smaller firms with no legal remedy for wrongdoing, even if some form
of litigation survives.
Finally, I argue that shareholder litigation without class actions—should
institutional investors choose to pursue it—would create a new distortion in the
private enforcement regime, what I call the “semi-circularity problem.” Without
class actions, negative-value claimants would no longer be able to recover for
their damages in shareholder litigation. But they would still be forced to subsidize
the losses of positive-value claimants to the extent that the smaller investors own
shares in defendant companies that must pay damages claims to large institutional
investor plaintiffs. Loss of the class action device creates a two-tier legal system
for investors: one in which large institutions may recover while individuals and
smaller institutions do not from the same fraud (or mispriced deal), and one in
which smaller investors that still own defendant companies must reach farther into
their pockets to compensate large institutional investor losses for that fraud (or
mispriced deal).
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INTRODUCTION
In the past 20 years, the securities class action has endured a series of
existential crises. The most recent example was Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton
(Halliburton II),1 in which the Supreme Court considered overruling precedent that
had allowed plaintiffs to rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to demonstrate
reliance in fraud cases.2 Without this theory, the shareholder class action cannot
proceed because individualized issues of reliance would predominate over
common issues and therefore the shareholder class could not be certified under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 As on prior occasions, the
securities class action survived the existential challenge in Halliburton II. And, as
on prior occasions, it did not do so intact. The Court’s decision allows defendants
to challenge whether the alleged misrepresentation affected the stock price at the
class certification stage, rather than at the summary judgment stage.4 Allowing
defendants to challenge causation at an earlier stage in the proceeding tilted
securities litigation even further in their favor.5 In so doing, Halliburton II
continued the general trend that recently led Professor Barbara Black to quip that,

1.
134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2.
Id. at 2407.
3.
Stephen M. Sinaiko and Arielle Warshall Katz, The Future Of The “Fraud
On The Market” Presumption In Securities Litigation: A Not-So-Basic Question, THE
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 18, 2013, at 26.
4.
Jordan Eth and Mark R.S. Foster, Beyond Basic: Supreme Court’s
Halliburton Ruling Strengthens Defenses In Securities Fraud Class Actions, MONDAQ (July
7, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/324908/Securities/Beyond+Basic+Supr
eme+Courts+Halliburton+Ruling+Strengthens+Defenses+in+Securities+Fraud+Class+Acti
ons (“Now defendants ‘may seek to defeat the Basic presumption’ at class certification,
rather than waiting for summary judgment or trial, by seeking to introduce ‘direct as well as
indirect price impact evidence.’ To do so, defendants can submit expert analyses, including
event studies, that demonstrate specific alleged misrepresentations did not affect the market
price of a stock. The Court reasoned that permitting this rebuttal by defendants at class
certification was necessary ‘to maintain the consistency of the presumption with the class
certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.’”).
5.
Id. (“By explicitly allowing defendants to rebut the presumption of
reliance . . . the Halliburton decision alters the status quo of securities litigation, and is
likely to breathe new life into the class certification stage of securities class actions.”).
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“[t]he attacks on the securities fraud class action never end.”6 Beginning with the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), a series of statutory
and judicial reforms to the securities class action have: (1) placed a ceiling on
damages;7 (2) eliminated aiding and abetting liability;8 (3) eliminated liability for
fraud participants who were nonspeakers;9 (4) denied discovery prior to a ruling on
the motion to dismiss;10 (5) instituted a higher pleading standard for scienter (the
highest pleading standard in civil procedure);11 (6) narrowed the scope of
causation;12 (7) barred the litigation of securities cases by classes of 50 or more
people in state court;13 and (8) allowed defendants to contest the efficiency of the
market for purposes of the fraud-on-the-market theory.14
The elimination of the securities class action has long been the goal of
some academics, policymakers, and business lobbies. 15 It is also part of a longterm retrenchment in the private attorney-general model for enforcing federal
statutes generally.16 At several points in this “death-of-a-thousand-cuts” approach

6.
Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 802 (2009).
7.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012).
8.
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
9.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (finding
respondents not liable to petitioner because respondents’ deceptive acts were not relied
upon by petitioners); Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (limiting primary liability under Rule 10b-5 to those persons who “made” the alleged
misstatement).
10.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
11.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See also
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (raising pleading standards from a “possibility” to a “plausibility” standard asking
“for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556)).
12.
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
13.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2012) (stating that “any covered class action in any
State court involving a covered security . . . . shall be removable to the Federal district court
for the district in which the action is pending”).
14.
See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
Additionally, as I noted above, due to the Supreme Court ruling in Halliburton II,
defendants can now present evidence to defeat the Basic presumption of reliance at an
earlier stage of litigation, specifically, the class certification stage. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
15.
Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory
Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1205
(2013) (discussing the numerous scholars and committees who believe that “securities class
actions are a major contributor to making the U.S. capital markets less competitive and less
attractive”).
16.
Stephen Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). Some scholars argue that the rise of shareholder
activism as a mechanism for policing managerial agency costs may be a response to the
policing void left by the narrowing of the shareholder class action. See James D. Cox and
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to securities class action reform, the threat of the latest reform was viewed as
existential. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.17 threatened to raise the
pleading burden for a “strong inference” of scienter—adopted in the PSLRA—to
the point where surviving a motion to dismiss would be impossible in all but the
most egregious frauds where the relevant factual information most likely became
public through either a whistleblower or a governmental investigation.18 In the
legislative arena, academic critics and powerful interest groups—including the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable—have repeatedly called
for elimination or reform of such actions.19 Such legislation may be more likely to
pass under Republican majorities in the House and Senate, although even divided
governments have adopted similar legislation—the PSLRA was adopted by a
Republican House and a Democratic Senate after the Senate overrode the veto of
President Clinton, a fellow Democrat. 20 Immediately preceding the recent financial
crisis, the Paulson Committee, appointed by former Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Paulson, argued that shareholder litigation undermined the competitiveness
of U.S. capital markets and called for increased guidance from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regarding the pleading for a 10b-5 claim and the
pursuit of alternatives to litigation for shareholders. 21 These proposals dropped off
of the legislative agenda during and after the recent financial crisis. But if history
is any guide, it is only a matter of time before additional legislative threats to the
existence of the 10b-5 class action emerge. The only thing that might prevent this
Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs through Private Litigation in the U.S.:
Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17.
551 U.S. 308 (2007). In his Tellabs concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that
“strong inference” should mean that the facts as pleaded had to be “more plausible than the
inference of innocence,” a far cry from the then-prevalent notice pleading standard. (I note
that Scalia’s standard is not the one adopted by the Court). Even now, the Tellabs standard
is a substantially higher burden than today’s general pleading standards under Twombly and
Iqbal, which require that the plaintiff’s claim be plausible, but not more plausible than the
defendant’s competing inference of innocence. Stephen Burbank has pointed out that certain
language in Twombly can be read to be even more demanding than the PSLRA standard
interpreted in Tellabs, a reading that Burbank concludes “would be ridiculous.” Stephen B.
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WISC. L. REV. 535, 552.
(2009). The standard also requires pleading facts. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329.
18.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (resolving a circuit split by holding that “[t]he
inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the
‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most plausible of competing inferences’” (quoting Fidel
v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004))).
19.
See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Policy Priorities for 2014, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE,
30
(2014)
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2014_policy
_priorities-september_2014.pdf (listing that they seek to “[o]ppose efforts by plaintiffs’ bar
to expand the abuse of the class action device” among other policy initiatives).
20.
Nicole M. Briski, comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and
Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 169 (2000) (“Despite President Clinton’s concerns
that Congress raised the pleading standard for scienter above that of the Second Circuit,
Congress overrode President Clinton’s veto and enacted the PSLRA into law . . . .”).
21.
R. Glenn Hubbard & John L. Thornton, Action Plan for Capital Markets¸
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at A16.

206

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:1

reemergence, even under Republican congressional control, is that legislative
reform would be mooted by procedural and judicial changes that threaten to
eliminate these actions without a vote. That would fit a long standing pattern of
legislatures avoiding action on litigation reform, possibly because they see that
reform is taking place in the courts, though perhaps also because of the difficulty
of legislating class action reforms.22
The most serious threats to the shareholder class action have already
emerged in two forms: unilateral board adoption of mandatory-arbitration
provisions or fee-shifting provisions in corporate bylaws. These threats follow the
aforementioned pattern in which class action opponents have shifted their efforts
to procedural, rather than substantive, reforms.23
Beginning with arbitration provisions, the Supreme Court’s recent
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) decisions combined with corporate-law decisions
in Delaware and elsewhere, strongly suggest that there is no remaining legal
barrier to a board unilaterally adopting bylaws requiring mandatory bilateral
arbitration of shareholder claims against the company, its board, or its managers.
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick has argued, that in the aftermath of Supreme Court
cases like AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion24 and American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant,25 businesses can bind their shareholders to arbitration
clauses with class action waivers, as long as the terms of the waiver are themselves
legal.26 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory-arbitration
provision in an AT&T cell phone contract, concluding that the FAA preempted
California’s criteria for determining when waivers in consumer contracts could be
deemed unconscionable.27 In American Express, the Supreme Court held that the
FAA “does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration
on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory
claim exceeds the potential recovery.”28 Fitzpatrick discusses these cases in the
context of shareholder approval of such bylaws, 29 but it appears as if shareholder
approval may not be necessary under the recent Delaware holdings, Boilermakers
Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. 30 and ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher

22.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16.
23.
Id. (describing the tactical shift by critics of the private attorney-general
model to pursue procedural rather than substantive or legislative reforms).
24.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
25.
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013).
26.
Brian Fitzpatrick, Is the End of Class Actions Upon Us?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-endof-class-actions-upon-us/ [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog].
27.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740.
28.
Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2306.
29.
Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog, supra note 26 (discussing the “transactional
relationship” between those who bring class actions and the businesses they bring class
actions against); see also Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, The End].
30.
73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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Tennis Bund.31 Ms. Claudia Allen has argued that Concepcion, American Express,
and these recent Delaware decisions suggest that a board-adopted mandatory
bylaw with a class action waiver would be enforceable, even if it sidestepped
shareholder approval.32 All of this cements the argument that there is no remaining
legal barrier to unilateral board adoption of mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting
provisions. In Boilermakers, then-Chancellor (and current Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court) Leo Strine upheld a forum-selection clause mandating
that shareholders sue the company only in Delaware 33 even though the board
adopted the clause without shareholder approval.34 The court held that Delaware
law places shareholders on notice that boards may change corporate bylaws at any
time without shareholder approval, so long as the bylaw complies with § 109 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), which bars bylaws that
conflict with the law.35 Mandatory-arbitration and fee-shifting bylaws might once
have conflicted with the law, but this no longer seems to be the case after
Concepcion and American Express.36
Corporate boards’ power to chip away at shareholder class actions was
further solidified in the second Delaware opinion, ATP. There, the Delaware
Supreme Court enforced a board-adopted bylaw that instituted a “plaintiff-pays”37
provision that requires shareholders to pay the company’s attorneys’ fees if the
shareholders “[do] not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves,
in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”38 Although the Delaware
legislature is considering amending the DGCL to bar such “loser pays” provisions,
the precedent stands.39 Boards may unilaterally limit the rights of company

31.
91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014).
32.
Claudia Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444771.
33.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939 (holding that “the bylaws are valid and
enforceable contractual forum selection clauses”).
34.
Id. See also North v. McNamara, No. 1:13-cv-833, 2014 WL 4684377, at *1,
*7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2014) (upholding a board-adopted forum-selection clause and
stating that such forum selection clauses generate “cost and efficiency benefits that inure to
the corporation and its shareholders by streamlining litigation.”).
35.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–40 (“[W]hen investors bought stock in
Chevron and FedEx, they knew (i) that consistent with 8 Del. C. § 109(a), the certificates of
incorporation gave the boards the power to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally . . . and
(iii) that board-adopted bylaws are binding on the stockholders.”).
36.
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
37.
Such provisions are frequently referred to as “loser-pays” provisions, but I
call them “plaintiff-pays” provisions because plaintiff could still win a judgment on the
merits and be forced to pay the defendants’ legal bill under the provision approved in ATP.
38.
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014).
39.
See The Fate of Delaware “Fee-Shifting” Bylaws, WSGR (July 11, 2014),
http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgrale
rt-fee-shifting-0714.htm; SB 236, An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to
General Corporate Law, OPEN:STATES (last visited Oct. 14, 2014)
http://openstates.org/de/bills/147/SB236/
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shareholders to sue them, within the broad limits of § 109.40 Boilermakers and
ATP strongly suggest that a board can unilaterally adopt a bylaw requiring
shareholders to arbitrate their claims, in part because the bylaw does not bar these
claims, but rather changes the forum in which they may be brought. That such a
provision would economically bar a remedy for meritorious but negative-value
claims41 would not seem to pose a legal barrier to their adoption. It did not stop the
U.S. Supreme Court from enforcing the mandatory-arbitration provision in
American Express.42 In fact, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence, the Delaware legislature might be preempted under the FAA from
barring board adoption of such mandatory-arbitration provisions.43
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the prospects for class
arbitration. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp.,44 the Court
held that arbitration provisions could not be construed to require class arbitration
absent consent to the class mechanism. Yet it left for another day the question of
what contractual basis might support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize
class action arbitration.45 In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,46 the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected the petitioners’ contention that an arbitrator exceeded
his powers under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA after the arbitrator found that the parties
had impliedly consented to class arbitration.47 These holdings requiring at least
implicit consent to class arbitration contrast with the approach taken in
international investor arbitration cases like Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna
40.
ATP, 91 A.3d at 558 (“Neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute
forbids the enactment of fee-shifting bylaws.”).
41.
“Negative Value class actions . . . are class actions where the costs in
establishing and collecting the individual claims are greater than the potential recovery.”
Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 753, 762 (2007).
42.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“But
the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
43.
Allen, supra note 32 (manuscript at 4–5) (“Reflecting the policy favoring
arbitration, the Supreme Court has held that state rules or laws that have a disproportionate
impact on, or discriminate against, arbitration agreements are preempted by the FAA . . . .”).
See also, Fitzpatrick, The End, supra note 29, at 187 (“[I]f Delaware decided as a matter of
its corporate law that corporations could not place arbitration clauses or class action waivers
in corporate bylaws or charters, there is at least an argument that the FAA could not
preempt that decision: corporate law is traditionally the domain of the states and there are
doctrines that force courts to presume that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws in
traditional state domains. On the other hand, contract law, too, is traditionally the domain of
the states, but that did not give the Supreme Court pause in Concepcion. In the end, then I
remain pessimistic that state law can slow class action waivers.”)
44.
559 U.S. 662 (2010).
45.
Id. at 685 (finding that a contractual basis is necessary to compel a party to
submit to class arbitration because “class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration
to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
submit their disputes to an arbitrator”).
46.
133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
47.
Id.
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a Beccara & Others) v. Argentine Republic,48 in which an international arbitration
panel took jurisdiction over the collectively filed claims of 60,000 Italian
bondholders dissatisfied with the restructuring of Argentine debt.49 The arbitration
clause in Abaclat excluded consent to class arbitration, but the arbitrators reasoned
that they had jurisdiction over each individual claimant and that “no separate
consent was required with regard to the form of the proceeding.”50 Taken together,
these U.S. cases suggest that corporate boards could unilaterally adopt carefully
drafted bylaws that require shareholders to arbitrate against them in bilateral
proceedings and that bar class arbitration or consolidation of such proceedings.
Such provisions, if upheld, would effectively terminate the possibility of collective
prosecution of fraud and transactional claims.
These U.S. court decisions all but reverse the SEC’s current policy
barring mandatory-arbitration provisions, at least at the initial public offering
(“IPO”) stage.51 Historically, the SEC refused to accelerate the registration
statements for companies going public whose charters included mandatoryarbitration provisions.52 Most recently, when the Carlyle Group sought to go
public, they “include[d] a provision that would have required future stockholders
to resolve any claim against [them] through arbitration rather than in court” in their
initial filings.53 Additionally, the provision precluded class action arbitration.54
Carlyle withdrew the provision from its filing documents after encountering
opposition from the SEC, potential investors, and shareholder rights activists.55
In light of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, it would not
be surprising if companies in the process of going public were to push back harder
against the SEC’s position on mandatory arbitration, particularly if there is a
48.
Giovanna a Beccara, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, (Aug. 4, 2011), sub nom. Abacalat & others v. Argentine Republic.
49.
See W.W. Park, The Politics of Class Action Arbitration: Jurisdictional
Legitimacy and Vindication of Contract Rights, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS DISPUTES (2d ed. 2012) (discussing Abaclat).
50.
Id. (contrasting the approaches to class arbitration taken in Animal Feeds and
Abaclat, and noting Animal Feeds’s effect on the economics of arbitration: “For the [Animal
Feeds] majority, respondents’ failure to consent to class proceedings trumped any efficiency
benefits from collective arbitration such as the sharing of costs that might otherwise inhibit
pursuit of claims.”).
51.
Karan Singh Tyagi & Gide Loyrette Nouel, Carlyle Leaves out Mandatory
Arbitration Clause in IPO, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/02/07/carlyle-leaves-out-mandatory-arbitrationclause-in-ipo/ (“Historically the SEC has disfavored mandatory shareholder arbitration
provisions.”).
52.
Id. (“In 1990, when Franklin First Financial Corp that was planning its IPO
sought to include an arbitration provision in its charter and bylaws, the SEC firmly objected
to its inclusion.”).
53.
Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition
Mounts, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0203/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban.html.
54.
Tyagi & Nouel, supra note 51.
55.
Id.
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change in administration.56 Regardless of whether the SEC maintains its position
against such provisions, there are already examples of boards unilaterally adopting
them. Most recently, in Corvex Management, LP v. Commonwealth REIT,57 the
Circuit Court of Maryland upheld a mandatory-arbitration bylaw that had been
unilaterally adopted by the board58—and Commonwealth REIT is not alone.59 The
effect of such bylaws, should they become widely adopted, would likely be “a
marked decline in class actions.”60 The primary purpose of arbitration provisions
in this context is not to shift shareholder claims from judges to arbitrators, but to
eliminate the claims entirely by undermining their economic viability. In his
dissenting opinion in Concepcion, Justice Breyer noted that, for negative-value
claimants, the loss of the class action is a substantive waiver of their claims. 61
There was a time when this purpose would have been illegitimate, and would have
led to courts striking down such provisions.62 But American Express made clear
that that time has passed.
It is true that some arguments remain as to why arbitration provisions
might not be enforceable in the shareholder context. One such argument is that the
securities laws explicitly bar anything that would reduce or eliminate the
shareholder rights they provide.63 The SEC has relied on such provisions to resist
the adoption of mandatory-arbitration clauses.64 However, Concepcion and
56.
See Weiss et al., supra note 53 (“Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said the
issue probably faced 3-2 ideological split on the current commission . . . .”). But see id.
(suggesting that Carlyle faced pushback from the SEC, potential investors, and other
interested parties).
57.
2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Cir. Ct. Balt. May 8, 2013). In the interest of
full disclosure, the Author submitted an affidavit, along with other academics, opposing
Commonwealth REIT’s adoption of a mandatory-arbitration provision. We were not
persuasive.
58.
Corvex Mgmt. v. Commonwealth REIT, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Cir. Ct.
Balt. May 8, 2013).
59.
See, e.g., id.; Holly Gregory, The Elusive Promise of Reducing Shareholder
Litigation Through Corporate Bylaws, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (June 9, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://blogs.
law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/09/; Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog, supra note 26.
60.
Allen, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3).
61.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“In California’s perfectly rational view, nonclass arbitration over such
[small] sums will also sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their
claims . . . .”); see also Am, Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
62.
See e.g., Mistubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,473 U.S.
614 (1985).
63.
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
64.
See Ralph C. Ferrara & Stacy A. Puente, Holding IPOs Hostage to Class
Actions: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in IPOs, 9 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1, 4 (2012) (“The
mandatory arbitration clause is by no means a novel invention. The [SEC]’s established
position has been that such clauses were void—particularly where the clause would limit a
shareholder’s ability to enforce his or her rights under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
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American Express offer little comfort that the Court would defer to the SEC’s view
of the securities laws, or that the securities laws would trump the FAA or
Delaware corporate law.65 Despite the limited, if nonexistent, legal barriers to the
widespread adoption of mandatory-arbitration and class action waivers, it remains
possible that businesses will not adopt them for a variety of reasons—including
opposition by their own shareholders. Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”),
the powerful proxy advisory firm, has stated that it recommends voting against
directors who vote to unilaterally amend company bylaws without shareholder
approval, and recently clarified that this advice includes unilateral amendments
affecting litigation rights.66 This could provide a powerful nonlegal counterweight
to arbitration provisions (and the plaintiff pays provisions discussed below)
because of ISS’s strong influence over proxy voters. 67 Similarly, the Council of
Institutional Investors (“CII”), a powerful investor coalition, has publicly stated its
opposition to the adoption of such provisions. 68 It and its members may be able to
dissuade corporate boards from adopting such bylaws. It is noteworthy that CII has
taken this position, given that its constituents comprise the set of investors that is
most likely to have positive-value claims and therefore most likely to be able to
continue to pursue those claims in arbitration.69 I will return to this point below.
Even investors beyond CII may be interested in obtaining credible commitments
from their investees that they should have a remedy for fraud, and may demand
retraction of mandatory-arbitration or “plaintiff-pays” provisions, or contract
around such provisions, before investing.

which would violate the prohibition against waiver of rights under Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act.” (internal citations omitted)); Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in
Public Company Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or A Descent into
Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 371, 407 (2008) (“The SEC . . . has been shortsightedly
insisting on a near ban on experimentation with ADR methods for domestic
companies . . . .”).
65.
See supra text accompanying notes 24–36.
66.
Ferrara & Puente, supra note 64.
67.
Michael J. Ryan, Jr., U.S. Capital Markets Competitiveness: The Unfinished
Agenda, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2011),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WE
B.pdf; see also James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2010) (finding that “with
a proposal that management recommends to shareholders, a negative ISS recommendation
seems to reduce the number of all shareholder ‘for’ votes by 28.8%” and that “when
management is opposed to a proposal, a negative ISS recommendation appears to lead to
another 33.3% drop in all shareholder voting support”).
68.
See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional
Investors, to Keith F. Higgins & John Ramsey, Dirs., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Dec.
11, 2013) (available at: http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence
/2013/12_11_13_CII_letter_to_SEC_forced_arbitration.pdf). See also Letter from Jeff
Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Patrick J. Leahy & Charles
Grassley, U.S. Senate (Dec. 12, 2013) (available at: http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_
advocacy/correspondence/2013/12_12_13_CII_letter_to_senate_judiciary_forced_arbitratio
n.pdf).
69.
See discussion infra Part V.
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Many of these same arguments apply to fee-shifting provisions.70 In the
aforementioned ATP case, the Delaware Supreme Court approved unilateral board
adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw that stated, in pertinent part:
In the event that . . . the Claiming Party . . . does not obtain a
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and
amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be
obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any
such member or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every
kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable
attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively,
“Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with
such Claim.71

As noted, the Delaware legislature is actively considering overturning the
Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in ATP, and there are mounting efforts to
challenge it or limit its scope.72 But already, 42 companies have adopted such
“loser-pays,” or what I call “plaintiff-pays” provisions, and some top law firms
have started incorporating them into certificates of incorporation in preparation for
IPOs.73 Under their own terms, even a favorable judgment on the merits that
obtains something less than “substantially . . . the full remedy sought” would still
require the plaintiff to pay legal fees;74 so would a favorable settlement that falls
short of a judgment on the merits. Provisions like these would expose plaintiffs to
substantial litigation costs, complicating the positive-value claim calculation.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers may be willing to bear the risk of a lost lawsuit from which they
recoup no legal fee and incur uncompensated out-of-pocket litigation costs, but
they may not be willing to bear the high risk of the defendants’ legal costs too.
They might rationally abandon securities class actions for another field. True, there
may be more legal barriers to the institution of fee-shifting provisions than there
are for mandatory-arbitration provisions, even apart from a decision by the
70.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private
Enforcement?, CLS BLUESKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-privateenforcement/.
71.
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014).
72.
S.J. Resolution 12 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014) ("[T]he Governor and the
Delaware General Assembly strongly support a level playing field that provides the ability
for stockholders and investors to seek relief on its merits in the Courts of this State and
believe that a proliferation of broad fee-shifting bylaws for stock corporations will upset the
careful balance that the State has strived to maintain between the interests of directors,
officers, and controlling stockholders, and the interests of other stockholders.") The
Delaware General Assembly will revisit this issue in early 2015.
73.
John C. Coffee, “Loser Pays: Who Will Be The Biggest Loser?” http://clsblu
esky.law.columbia.edu/2014/11/24/loser-pays-who-will-be-the-biggest-loser/; see also Lee
Rudy, Litigation Bylaws, CII (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_a
dvocacy/legal_issues/Litigation%20Bylaws.pdf?utm_source=12-04-14+CII+Gover
nance+Alert&utm_campaign=12-04-14+CII+Alert&utm_medium=email (documenting 42
companies that adopted fee-shifting bylaws as of Nov. 19, 2014).
74.
ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 557.
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Delaware legislature to backtrack on them. For example, a federal court could
discover a conflict between the fee-shifting provision and the securities laws,
thereby preempting the provision, or the Delaware Chancery Court could find that
it had an “improper purpose.”75 As discussed below, there is some evidence
plaintiffs’ lawyers abandoned tort cases for patent litigation in response to state
tort reform. Additionally, ISS has recently recommended voting, “against bylaws
that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the
merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).” 76 And as noted
above, ISS generally recommends against voting for directors who voted to
unilaterally amend company bylaws without shareholder approval, including
unilateral amendments affecting litigation rights.77 Because these guidelines were
recently updated to account for the possible spread of plaintiff pays provisions, it
remains to be seen whether the boards at the 42 companies that adopted them prior
to the updates will emerge unscathed. ISS itself has endured significant criticism
and calls for its regulation by the same groups that have criticized shareholder
litigation and advocated for fee-shifting and arbitration provisions. 78 It is possible
that under the next Republican \administration in the White House, ISS might see
its clout decline. Regardless, the fight over these litigation provisions will
continue. These developments in shareholder litigation increasingly look like
developments we are seeing in litigation more broadly, specifically, the dilution or
elimination of class action incentives through litigation and procedural reform.79 It
is ironic that they should appear now in the shareholder litigation context,
considering that the international trend runs in precisely the opposite direction.
Australia, Canada, China, The Netherlands, Germany, Israel, and South Korea
have all reformed their legal systems to enable the creation of private securities
class actions.80 Many have done so within the past 10–15 years.81
But the purpose of this Article is not to make predictions about how the
investor politics of mandatory-arbitration and fee-shifting provisions will play out
in the United States, whether corporations will adopt them, or whether some other
threats to the shareholder class action might emerge. Instead, I begin at the end of
the story by imagining the elimination of the shareholder class action, and
predicting what shareholder litigation would look like if the class action
75.
Coffee, supra note 70.
76.
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, United States Concise Proxy Voting
Guidelines: 2015 Benchmark Policy Recommendations 1, 8 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/usconcisevotingguidelines2015.pdf.
77.
Id. at 4.
78.
Ryan, supra note 67.
79.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16, at 1613 (“Litigation seeking to narrow
private rights of action, attorneys’ fee awards, and standing, and to expand arbitration,
achieved growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court,
particularly over the past two decades.”)
80.
Paul A. Ferrillo, A New Playbook for Global Securities Litigation and
Regulation, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION
(Feb. 2, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-newplaybook-for-global-securities-litigation-and-regulation/.
81.
Id.
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disappeared. Much of the critical literature on class actions focuses, quite
legitimately, on how they fall short of the ideals of deterrence and compensation. 82
Here, I aim to reframe the debate over shareholder class actions by offering what I
hope is informed speculation about what we would be left with if they vanished.
There are two purposes to this thought experiment: to imagine the set of possible
futures for shareholder litigation without class actions and to offer a basis for
assessing not just how shareholder class actions fall short of the ideals of
deterrence and compensation, but how they compare to what we will be left with if
they disappear.
For the sake of argument, I assume the disappearance of the class action
through some type of procedural or substantive reform like adoption of mandatoryarbitration provisions both requiring bilateral arbitration of shareholder claims, and
barring consolidation of such claims. The purpose of this assumption is to assess
how loss of a viable collective means of pursuing shareholder claims will change
the shareholder-litigation landscape. But, because there are many ways for the
shareholder class action to perish, I try to maintain flexibility in discussing what a
future litigation landscape would look like without it, regardless of exactly how the
class action were to disappear.83 Fee-shifting provisions, for example, would
eliminate the class action not by shifting it into arbitration but by rendering the
contingency-fee model too risky for any firm to bear. I discuss the economics of
fee shifting below in Part IV. Fee shifting might effectively eliminate shareholder
litigation by making only overwhelmingly meritorious cases worth bringing. To be
sure, the ways in which the shareholder class action might be reduced or
eliminated vary, and would have important effects on how a post-shareholderclass-action world would look. But it is not necessary to wait until the exact details
are known before making some assessment of how class action restrictions would
change shareholder litigation. In making this assessment, one can become mired in
describing the many differences between litigation and arbitration generally,
something which has been debated at great length elsewhere. 84 To avoid
recapitulating these debates here, I aim to confine my analysis to those aspects of
shareholder litigation and arbitration that are unique to the shareholder context.
I develop a few main lines of inquiry into the future of shareholder
litigation under a legal regime that substantially limits, if not effectively
eliminates, the class action device. First, in Part I, I describe the current landscape
for shareholder litigation. I then assess what would disappear from it along with
the class action. For example, I argue that much of transactional litigation would
be eliminated or would shift into appraisal litigation, depending somewhat on
whether attorneys’ fees and costs would still be available to plaintiffs. In addition,
corporate governance reform efforts would all but disappear from these cases,

82.
See, e.g., Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1194–1203 (discussing how
securities class actions fall short of achieving either deterrence or compensation).
83.
The content of the arbitration clauses matters, as I discuss in further detail
below. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
84.
See generally Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go
Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002).
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perhaps with a handful of such efforts surviving if companies consent to
consolidated arbitration proceedings when faced with multiple simultaneous
arbitrations. Disclosure-only settlements would also likely disappear. While
disclosure settlements are often viewed as frivolous, there is some empirical
support for the value of litigated corporate governance reforms.85
In Part II, I assess what would remain of shareholder litigation. I describe
how the legal architecture of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), state pension codes, and the fiduciary duties governing mutual funds,
banks, and insurance companies would shape institutional investor litigation
behavior in a post-class-action world—at least for the institutions that could
plausibly have positive-value claims.86 I articulate how the class action has
historically benefited institutional investors by reducing their monitoring and
litigation costs.87 I argue that institutional investors will be required to create
internal monitoring mechanisms that are likely more costly than those they employ
now to monitor potential claims in class actions. This is because fund fiduciaries
are subject to a clear duty to investigate potentially positive-value claims. I further
argue that the fiduciary standards of ERISA and state pension codes likely compel
institutions to bring positive-value claims. Fund fiduciaries will retain substantial
discretion in deciding whether a particular claim is positive or not, and the
litigation risk faced by a trustee for declining to bring a claim after careful
deliberation of its merits will be substantially lower than the risk to a trustee for
failure to investigate the claim.88 How many funds will have such positive-value
claims, how large those claims will be, and how likely the funds will be to pursue
them, are three critically important empirical questions. The answers will
determine whether the death of the securities class action means the death of all
shareholder litigation, or whether any significant shareholder litigation survives. I
offer incomplete, but suggestive evidence on this point. Still, for a variety of
reasons discussed below, courts will be less likely to defer to litigation decisions in
the shareholder-litigation context than they would be in the context in which
failure-to-sue claims have ordinarily been brought, that is, against plan sponsors
for failing to make required contributions. 89 And for the most part, such decisions
will be evaluated under a less-deferential standard than the business judgment
rule,90 because of the higher fiduciary standards applied under trust law, ERISA,
and comparable state pension codes.
In Part III, I discuss the insurance landscape for funds governed by
ERISA and state pension codes, particularly the latter, which are more restrictive
85.
See infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text for a discussion of pursuing
corporate governance reforms through shareholder litigation.
86.
See discussion infra Part II.
87.
See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying text.
88.
See infra Part II.B.
89.
See infra Part II.B.2.
90.
The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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and unpredictable than the directors’ and officers’ insurance with which most
corporate law scholars and practitioners are familiar. As I demonstrate below, this
is particularly true for public pension-fund fiduciaries who remain largely
uninsured and who are told that they are protected from suit by sovereign
immunity, even though the decision whether to exercise such immunity is beyond
their control.91 Thus far, the existence of class action settlements whose fairness
has been certified by a judge has offered fund fiduciaries de facto immunity from
suit for participating in such settlements. 92 The absence of the class action device
certifying such fairness creates greater unpredictability for fund fiduciaries. This
should make trustees more sensitive to at least investigate potentially positivevalue claims. Some of the funds that might otherwise have resisted detecting or
bringing positive-value claims will make these decisions in a less secure and
predictable insurance environment than that in which directors and officers make
similar decisions. I also argue that legal uncertainty may contribute to herding
behavior around arbitration decisions. And I argue that the decline of the
transactional class action in particular may be offset by, and may enhance, the rise
of appraisal litigation, particularly of hedge fund participation in such litigation.
In Part IV, I discuss how loss of the class action device would affect the
plaintiffs’ bar. I map out a range of scenarios, including the end of the plaintiffs’
bar, new competition for plaintiff-side work from the traditional defense bar, and a
new world of shareholder arbitration in which only elite firms with established
connections to institutional investors survive, while weaker firms tending to bring
frivolous cases with individual lead plaintiffs perish.
Finally, in Part V, I argue that shareholder litigation without class actions
creates a new market distortion that primarily affects individual investors and
small institutional investors, what I call the “semi-circularity problem.” Without
class actions, negative-value claimants will, in all likelihood, lose the ability to
recover their damages in shareholder litigation.93 But these negative-value
claimants will still be forced to subsidize the losses of large institutional
investors—positive-value claimants—to the extent that the negative-value
claimants own shares in defendant companies that must pay damages claims to

91.
See infra notes 239–250 and accompanying text.
92.
See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
93.
Professors Myriam Gilles and Anthony Sebok have proposed two potential
models under which even small, individual claims might remain economically viable in the
arbitration context. These models include litigating an initial case in court to establish a
favorable precedent that could then be used serially in arbitration, and utilizing “arbitration
entrepreneurs” to purchase small claims and arbitrate them in one action. Myriam Gilles &
Anthony Sebok, Crowd Classing Individual Arbitrations In A Post-Class Action Era, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 456–57 (2012). Both of these models seem plausible, though the
authors themselves caution, “[n]either is a sure bet; both face serious challenges, and even if
used in tandem by sophisticated legal risk takers, these approaches do not provide a very
satisfactory substitute for class action litigation.” Id. at 483. Also, if boards unilaterally
adopt mandatory-arbitration provisions, there will be no opportunity to litigate that initial
case in court for purposes of establishing a favorable legal precedent, because that initial
suit will have to be arbitrated, like all the rest.
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institutional investor plaintiffs.94 Loss of the class action device enshrines this
semi-circularity problem into our law, creating a two-tier legal system for
investors—one in which, from the same fraud (or mispriced deal), large
institutions recover damages while individuals and small institutions do not, and
one in which small investors must reach farther into their pockets to compensate
large institutional losses for that fraud (or mispriced deal). I argue that this
development cuts to the heart of one core purpose of securities regulation: the idea
of maintaining a level legal and informational playing field between investors. I
also argue that the end of the class action means abandonment of the idea that
investors should be compensated for losses due to fraud or other corporate
malfeasance, and I demonstrate that loss of the class action leaves investors in
smaller firms with no remedy for wrongdoing. It is true that compensation for such
harm is already quite small, and its loss might not be missed. But it creates
potentially unwelcome incentives favoring large institutional investors over
smaller institutions and individuals, rather than maintaining a traditionally more
level legal playing field for such investors, regardless of size.

I. THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
WITH AND WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS
In the past decade, public-pension funds and labor-union funds have
obtained lead plaintiff appointments in approximately 40% of both securities-fraud
and transactional class actions.95 Active institutional leadership of these class
actions has not always been the norm, but two legal reforms facilitated this change.
At the federal level, the PSLRA created a rebuttable presumption—appointing the
applicant with the largest loss in the purported fraud as lead plaintiff. 96 This reform
was designed to encourage institutional leadership of class actions because, due to
their sizable assets, institutions were most likely to have the largest losses.97 In

94.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class
Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 409 (2008)
(“Typically, the members of the plaintiff class are paid the settlement by the corporation
(and not by the individual defendants). As a result, the cost of recovery falls primarily on
those shareholders who are not in the class.”).
95.
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 315 (2008); Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An
Empirical Assessment of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 363 (2012); David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and
Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 934 (2014) (institutions obtain 41%
of lead plaintiff appointments in Delaware transactional litigation) [hereinafter Webber,
Private Policing].
96.
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012) (“[T]he court shall adopt a
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this
subchapter is the person or group of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class . . . .”).
97.
See R. Chris Heck, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional
Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1999)
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theory, institutional investor lead plaintiffs would carefully and skillfully monitor
class counsel, because they would be motivated by their large loss to seek a
substantial recovery, and because they are sophisticated enough to police the
lawyers’ conduct in the litigation.98 Several years later, the Delaware Chancery
Court—the traditional forum for transactional class actions 99—adopted similar
criteria favoring the selection of institutional investor lead plaintiffs.100 Following
these reforms, some institutional investors began participating as lead plaintiffs in
both federal securities-fraud and Delaware transactional class actions. Mutual
funds and hedge funds avoided taking an active role in these suits, rarely serving
as lead plaintiffs, whereas public-pension and labor-union funds frequently
obtained lead-plaintiff appointments.101
Mutual funds have $15 trillion assets under management; Fidelity,
Vanguard, and TIAA-CREF are some of the largest institutional investors in the
world, and undoubtedly have enough exposure to obtain lead-plaintiff
appointments if they pursue them.102 But they don’t. First, such funds are
concerned about the cost of freeriding competitors, who are also likely to be class

(“The core of [Weiss & Beckerman’s] argument is that, unlike individual investors who
often stand to recover only small amounts from securities fraud litigation, institutions are
likely to have suffered large losses from fraud.”).
98.
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104
YALE L.J. 2053, 2095 (1995) (“Institutions’ large stakes give them an incentive to monitor,
and institutions have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether
plaintiffs’ attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”).
99.
See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 1 (Univ. Tex. Law,
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 174 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404
(offering evidence that transactional class actions have been leaving Delaware). But see
Adam B. Badawi, Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of MultiJurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2013) (suggesting return of
transactional class actions to Delaware).
100.
Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. CIV.A. 19575, 2002 WL1558342, at
*2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002); TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No.
18336, 18289, 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000); Webber, Private
Policing, supra note 95, at 910.
101.
I have written extensively about why certain fund types avoid leadership
roles in these suits while others embrace them. See Webber, Private Policing, supra note
95, at 935 (discussing an empirical study of institutional lead plaintiffs from 2003 to 2009 in
Delaware). I summarize the discussion in this paper because understanding the litigation
dynamics faced by institutional investors in a world with class actions is crucial to
understanding how those dynamics would change if the class action world disappeared.
102.
Compare INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (54th ed.
2014), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf (reporting that there were $15
trillion invested in mutual funds worldwide in 2013), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 753 tbl. 1217 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1219.pdf (reporting that there
were $2.928 trillion invested by state and local public-pension funds in 2010).
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members.103 To the extent that serving as lead plaintiff incurs costs, even
reimbursable costs, mutual funds might prefer to remain as passive class members
for fear of incurring costs for themselves while conferring benefits on those
competitors.104 Because the PSLRA bars bonus payments for lead plaintiffs,
limiting lead-plaintiff recoveries to the lead plaintiff’s pro rata share of losses,
funds concerned about freeriding competitors may rationally decline to pursue
lead-plaintiff appointments, even if their own recoveries would improve by
assuming a leadership role in the suit.105
There are several other reasons why mutual funds avoid the lead-plaintiff
role:
First, a substantial component of the mutual fund business consists
of investing the 401(k) retirement savings of public company
employees. These funds will not want to jeopardize this business by
suing their customers, the corporate boards, and corporate managers
that select which mutual fund options to offer their employees.
Second, mutual funds may also avoid litigation for “social network”
reasons. Unlike the firefighters, police officers, and teachers who sit
on the boards of trustees of public-pension funds, mutual fund
managers are more likely to travel in the same business, social, and
educational circles as do corporate managers and directors. Such
social-network effects may reduce their participation in aggressive
activism “within the circle.” Because mutual funds diversify their
investments, the kind of activism that would be logical for them to
pursue bears a closer resemblance to that undertaken by publicpension funds, which is based in part on a strategy of pursuing
change at a broad swath of companies, and thereby potentially
alienating many people within the social network. In addition, as
relayed to me by a director of corporate governance and associate
general counsel at a top mutual fund, such funds avoid leading
activist campaigns because their financial analysts prize, and guard,
their access to senior corporate managers. Such analysts prefer that
their employers avoid actions that might alienate corporate
managers who might then refuse to respond to their inquiries. This
is not to say that mutual funds engage in no activism. But they
usually allow public-pension funds and labor-union funds to take

103.
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 461–62 (1991) (discussing the free rider problem
and its benefits).
104.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1052–54 (2007) (concluding
that shareholder activism only benefits a mutual fund “to the extent that the fund has a
higher stake in the portfolio company (relative to the fund size) than competing funds do
and the costs of activism are less than the profits from that differential”).
105.
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(4) (2012) (“The share of any final judgment or of any
settlement that is awarded to a representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be
equal, on a per share basis, to the portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all
other members of the class.”).
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the lead, to become the public face of activist initiatives, following
the lead of these funds by occasionally voting in favor of their
activist initiatives. Finally, different mutual fund managers within
the same mutual fund family may hold different stakes in the target
and bidder companies, and may have adverse interests in the
outcome of the suit. Engaging in litigation or activism may raise
conflicts within the mutual fund family. Thus, free-riding
competitors, business conflicts, social-network conflicts, and
conflicts within mutual fund families all deter mutual funds from
obtaining lead plaintiff appointments.106

Similar conflicts exist for other large private, diversified investors—like
banks, insurance companies, and endowments—which rarely assume lead-plaintiff
appointments.107
Hedge funds also avoid the lead-plaintiff role due to freeriding concerns.
In addition, hedge funds tend to be secretive about their trading strategies and,
thus, may be reluctant to subject themselves to the type of discovery that lead
plaintiffs typically endure. 108 As I discuss further below, the existence of class
actions allows such funds to remain passive in the face of known positive-value
claims, because the claims will be resolved in a class action, for which the funds
can collect their pro rata share of losses.109 Elimination of the class action may
place such funds in more of a legal quandary than they currently face with regard
to litigation.
In contrast to mutual funds and hedge funds, the free-rider problem is of
less concern to public-pension funds and labor-union funds. This is because these
funds lack true competitors.110 I proposed in Private Policing that these funds lack
true competitors:
106.
Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 941–43.
107.
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions
to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005)
(“[P]rivate and public-pension funds, [such as] life and casualty insurance companies,
mutual funds, bank trust departments, and various endowments . . . share a common bond:
wise stewardship of the portfolio managed by each financial institution redounds to the
benefit of another, be that person a pensioner, policyholder, stockholder, beneficiary, or
even a faculty member. For this reason, the managers of each type of financial institution
are subject to variously expressed fiduciary obligations that compel their prudent
stewardship of their portfolio.”).
108.
See, e.g., Hedge Fund Trading Styles Overview, MACROPTION,
http://www.macroption.com/hedge-fund-trading-styles-overview/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2014) (“Due to tough competition, a viable [hedge fund] trading strategy requires a lot of
details and nuances . . . . Hedge fund managers often keep their trading strategies secret to
preserve their competitive advantage and the strategy’s profitability.”).
109.
See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
110.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 104, at 1065–66 (discussing the strategic and
financial reasons that contribute to a hedge funds ability to “not worry much about
competitor funds free riding on their governance activism and getting higher returns with
lower costs”).
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Individuals employed by a state or local government entity, or in
certain capacities by a private company, have their retirement
savings automatically invested in the public-pension fund or laborunion fund associated with their employer. If a fund beneficiary is
unhappy with the fund’s performance, the beneficiary’s only option
is to change jobs, not move one’s retirement savings to a
competitor. Thus, while public-pension funds and labor-union funds
still face the free rider problem when serving as lead plaintiffs, or
engaging in any activism, they incur fewer costs from such free
riding than do mutual funds.111

These funds are able to incur lower costs because they do not experience
“outflows” (or “inflows”) on a quarterly or yearly basis in response to fund
performance.112 Such funds are also not dependent on revenues from class action
defendants (such as the fees mutual funds earn for managing defendant 401k
plans). Public-pension funds are funded by government employers and
employees,113 while labor-union funds are funded by private employers and
workers, and face fewer economic constraints on suing companies other than their
own employers.114 Thus, public-pension funds and labor-union funds lack the
major disincentives to participate in these suits that prevent mutual- and hedgefund participation. Their substantial involvement as lead plaintiffs may also be
explained by their prior success in bringing such suits. Public-pension lead
plaintiffs have been found to correlate with higher recoveries and lower attorneys’
fees in both securities-fraud and transactional class actions. 115 Many of these funds
have also signed up for portfolio monitoring by plaintiffs’ law firms.116 Outside
law firms directly monitor the portfolios of such funds for exposure to securities
fraud or transactional claims, placing the funds on notice that they may be eligible
to serve as lead plaintiffs in such actions.117
Two benefits of the class action device described above are that: it lets
these institutions recover for claims that would otherwise be negative-value and it
111.
David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class
Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157, 206 (2012) [hereinafter Webber, Plight].
112.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 104, at 1052–53.
113.
Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 837, 837 (2010) (“State and local government employers typically fund . . . pension
plans through a combination of employer and employee contributions . . . .”).
114.
David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public-Pension Fund Class
Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2071–72 (2010) [hereinafter
Webber, Pay-to-Play] (describing the role unions play in securities actions).
115.
C.S. Agnes Cheng, et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder
Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356–62 (2010) (using a database from 1996 to 2005 and
controlling for case determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, found that
institutional investors, including public-pension funds, decrease the probability of a case
being dismissed, increase monetary recoveries, and improve the independence of boards at
defendant companies); Perino, supra note 95; Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at
924–25.
116.
Webber, Plight, supra note 111, at 167.
117.
Id. (describing the benefits of having plaintiffs’ firms monitor portfolios).
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lets them choose to remain passive about positive-value claims. There are more
than 4,000 public-pension funds in the United States.118 Obviously, the vast
majority are not going to lead class actions, even if they wanted to. In a prior
study, I found that 79 public-pension funds had obtained a lead-plaintiff
appointment between 2003 and 2006, and that 20 of the 53 largest funds by asset
size had obtained at least one lead-plaintiff appointment.119 Thus, the vast majority
of public-pension funds—and even a simple majority of the very largest public
pensions (with $10 billion or more in assets) that are most likely to have positivevalue claims—remain passive in class actions.
Passivity has its benefits. It reduces the cost of monitoring and litigating a
claim. Funds can remain passive because when they are exposed to a purported
fraud or a rigged transaction, it is nearly certain that a class action will be filed.120
Therefore, there is almost nothing that a fund must do with regard to its claim
other than file a claim form to recover in the class action. 121 As a theoretical
matter, it is true that fiduciaries should review the size of their claim and consider
opting out, rather than remaining class members. 122 But as a practical matter, the
118.
Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered Defined Benefit
Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/govs/retire/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014)
(“There were 227 state-administered and 3,771 locally-administered defined public pension
systems . . . .”).
119.
Webber, Pay to Play, supra note 114.
120.
It is true, as a theoretical matter, that a fund could have a positive-value
claim for securities fraud or a Revlon violation in which no class action has been filed. But
most of the evidence points to an excess rather than a dearth of class actions, at least in deal
cases. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of
State Competition and Litigation, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758. I have found no examples of pension trustees being sued
for failing to bring a positive-value claim for securities fraud or Revlon, though that could
change if the class action disappears, as I argue in Part II.A.
121.
Of course, the institution must still follow through and actually file the claim
to recover its pro rata share of the settlement. In two surprising and revealing studies, Cox
and Thomas demonstrated that a large percentage of institutional investors failed to file
claims for their pro rata shares of securities class action settlements. See Cox & Thomas,
supra note 107. Cox and Thomas argued that such a failure to file claims constituted a
breach of the duty of care. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 855 (2002). In so doing, they surveyed a broad array of institutional investor
types—ranging from public-pension funds, labor-union funds, and mutual funds, to
insurance companies, banks, and others—to argue the potential consequences to them of
failing to file a claim, or failing to seek a lead plaintiff appointment. They based their
argument, in part, on Chancellor Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation, stating that directors have “a good faith [duty] to be informed and to
exercise appropriate judgment . . . .” In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d.
959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
122.
Securities Litigation Settlement Costs if Large Shareholders Opt Out, CRA
INSIGHTS:
FIN.
MARKETS
(June
2013),
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Securities-litigation-settlement-costs-iflarge-shareholders-opt-out.pdf (“[O]pting out of a class may considerably increase the
recovery in certain securities litigation. However, opting out . . . involves bearing the costs
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risk of a fiduciary being held liable for failing to opt out is close to zero. 123 That is
because the institutions’ passive participation is ratified by judicial approval of
both class certification and class settlement. Such approval offers almost complete
immunity to fund boards for any claim that the board failed to identify or to litigate
a positive-value claim; claims which could be made by fund participants and
beneficiaries, fund investors, government entities like the U.S. Department of
Labor for funds governed by ERISA, or state attorneys general. As long as the
fund filed its claim form, the potential defendants in such an action can claim that
the recovery it obtained was certified as fair by a judge. There would seem to be
no better defense to a breach of fiduciary duty claim than the argument that a judge
certified that the collected settlement was fair. The only cases in which fund
boards have been sued for failing to opt out of a class action are those involving
unique and exceptional circumstances.124
Elimination of the class action removes this legal insulation for fund
boards, exposing them more directly to liability for failure to identify, or litigate,
positive-value claims. In the next Part, I discuss the requirement that fiduciaries
monitor their portfolios for potential claims, their duty to act on positive-value
claims, and how each of these duties will become more expensive and time
consuming in the absence of a class action regime. Of course, active,
individualized pursuit of such claims could also result in better recoveries to the
fund—a point I consider further below.125 The point here is that, if the class action
disappears, many institutional investors that passively participate in class actions
by collecting their pro rata share of settlements—like mutual funds, banks, and
insurance companies—may be forced to vindicate their fiduciary duties by
monitoring their portfolios for positive-value claims and potentially acting on
those claims. While such entities may not wish to devote resources to these
endeavors, it’s not clear that this development would be wholly unwelcome.
Litigation by sophisticated players like these could not only improve their own
recoveries in class actions, but could have positive externalities (like deterrence)
for other investors, including individual investors. But before turning to what
institutions will do in the absence of a class action, and consequently what
litigation will survive, I discuss briefly what litigation will disappear without the
class action device.

of filing and pursuing litigation, the publicizing of potentially embarrassing internal analysis
and communications, and the risk that the claims may be dismissed due to specific
individual issues.”).
123.
Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying in part
motion to dismiss ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims against pension fiduciaries and
sponsor for, inter alia, “failing to conduct an adequate review and evaluation of the fairness
of the [securities class action] settlement . . . in light of The Plan’s unique ERISA claims”).
124.
See infra text accompanying note 163.
125.
See supra note 122.
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II. HOW LOSS OF THE CLASS ACTION WILL RESHAPE SECURITIES
LITIGATION
A. What Disappears
It is possible that virtually all private-shareholder litigation will disappear
without the class action. Even claimants with large losses that would more than
justify the ordinary litigation costs might balk at the contingent liability of paying
defendants’ legal bills in the presence of a plaintiff-pays provision. The
unpredictability of arbitration awards could similarly lead potential plaintiffs with
sizeable claims to demur litigation. These points are debatable, and I address them
more fully in the next Part, where I explore the options for institutional investors
with large losses in a post-class-action world. In this Section, I focus on what will
most certainly be eliminated from shareholder litigation without the class action,
including the pursuit of corporate governance reform, most M&A litigation in its
current form, and most of the positive externalities of litigation, which, in many
respects, outweigh the positive externalities of arbitration.
If courts were to uphold mandatory-arbitration provisions in corporate
bylaws, particularly bylaws that would require bilateral arbitration and bar
consolidation of claims, this would eliminate the shareholder class action for any
company that adopted them.126 This would bar redress for most investors with
negative-value claims against the company. Because these cases are expensive to
litigate or arbitrate, most claims by individual investors would become
economically unviable, as would most claims by institutional investors that have
low stakes in particular companies. It is true that some negative-value claims
might still be brought. The literature on negative-value claims suggests that they
still have settlement value because it might be cheaper for defendants to settle
rather than litigate a case that they are certain to win. 127 Also, informational
asymmetries may make the plaintiffs’ threat to take the case to trial credible,
particularly when they have private information about damages. 128 Still, the
economic models that explore the bringing of negative-value suits envision
problems like the defendants’ lack of information about the plaintiffs’ damages. In
securities-fraud suits, the damages are transparent. The defendants know exactly
what the claimed losses can be, because the stock price drop is public. The only
information they lack is how many shares the plaintiffs own. To prevent
defendants from settling securities-fraud cases due to discovery costs, Congress

126.
See supra text accompanying notes 22–36.
127.
See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (2004) (“A
profit maximizing defendant rationally would settle for any amount up to the cost of
defeating the plaintiff’s claim.”); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model In Which
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
128.
Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Suing Solely To Extract A Settlement Offer, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 437, 440 (1986).
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banned discovery prior to the motion to dismiss in the PSLRA. 129 Moreover, these
lawsuits are dominated by repeat players, experts who often litigate nothing other
than securities-fraud and merger class actions. The lawyers can easily size up the
comparative strength of their opponents’ position. Plaintiffs with negative-value
claims are more poorly positioned to extract settlements in the shareholder
litigation context than they might be in the generic litigation context because
defense lawyers are so often sophisticated repeat players. It is also true that large
institutional investors that can afford the legal fees might still bring negative-value
claims if they believe it will help discipline managers, although free-rider
problems could hamper such efforts. Most likely, negative-value claimants would
be left with no recourse for fraud, and the overall damages claims in securitiesfraud cases would drop substantially. 130 Loss of the class action would eliminate
more than just negative-value claims. It would also substantially reduce, and
possibly eliminate, actions and remedies that are only rationally pursued in the
class action context, even by investors with positive-value claims.
For example, corporate governance reform has been pursued in the class
action context, rarely as the primary objective of such litigation, but as an
alternative to damages or other relief.131 Governance reform is rooted in the idea
that increasing managerial accountability to shareholders improves firm value and
share price.132 Declassifying boards, creating a shareholder director-nomination
committee, and splitting the role of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board, are
all examples of governance reforms that tend to be pursued in litigation.133 To the
extent that they improve the investment’s value, investors that hold shares in the
defendant company post-fraud might benefit from such reforms. In the class action
context, the class’s damages may be large enough to materially harm the
company—thus, shareholders with an ongoing stake in the defendant corporation

129.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (West 2014) (“In any private action arising
under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency
of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
that party.”).
130.
As described more fully below in Part II.B, damages claims must be
distinguished from damages awarded. There is some evidence that institutional investors
who have opted out of class actions have obtained substantially higher recoveries as a
percentage of their losses than are normally obtained in class actions, suggesting that
damages awarded might not drop as far as damages claimed in a post-class-action world.
131.
See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting as a cause for objection that “the lead plaintiff negotiated as part of the settlement
certain governance changes”).
132.
See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009).
133.
See, e.g., In re United Health Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094
(D. Minn. 2008); Press Release, CalPERS, UnitedHealth Group Reach $895 Million
Settlement in Class-Action Case – Includes Landmark Corporate Governance Reforms (July
2,
2008),
http://www.calpers-governance.org/marketinitiatives/initiatives/pressreleases/unitedhealth-reach-settlement; Cendant, 264 F.3d at 246.

226

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:1

might prefer governance reform to the maximum immediate damages payment.134
But that is no longer true when institutional investors separately arbitrate their
fraud claims. No single investor’s claim can threaten a large publically traded
company the way a class action can. And even if the separate arbitration of many
institutional investors add up to damages that could materially harm the defendant,
each plaintiff faces a prisoner’s dilemma, it will not reduce its own claim in the
hope that others will do the same and thus it is rational for a plaintiff to seek the
largest damage claim it can get. Each institution also faces the free-rider problem
in seeking governance reform. If it arbitrates such reform, all investors would
benefit, in contrast to a damages payment made directly and solely to the
arbitrating plaintiff in compensation for its losses. Finally, even if an institution
were to seek reform in arbitration, it is doubtful that a defendant would agree to it,
because the plaintiff cannot speak for the whole class of shareholders and therefore
cannot bind it to one set of reforms.135 A defendant could theoretically face
multiple, conflicting reform proposals from multiple arbitration plaintiffs.
Lawsuits seeking governance reforms are often depicted as frivolous,
although one might draw a distinction between cases in which reform is the only
remedy versus cases in which reform is a small part of the remedy. In the case of
the former, while reforms might plausibly be value enhancing, there is justifiable
concern that they might be largely cosmetic, designed to justify a legal fee rather
than enhance value. In contrast, consider a case like the UnitedHealth Stock
Options Backdating case (full disclosure: I worked on this case). There, the cases
settled for $970 million and governance reforms like splitting the role of CEO and
Chair and reforming the compensation committee to prevent the corporate
breakdown that led to backdating in the first place. Perhaps I am biased because of
my own work on this case, but it strikes me as plausible that the reforms secured in
this case could have had a salutary effect on governance that would have helped
the company avoid future accounting improprieties. Regardless, for the reasons
just described, it is difficult to see how such reforms might be pursued in the
arbitration context.136
134.
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243 (arguing that “a lead plaintiff who retains a
substantial investment in a defendant corporation . . . will naturally be conflicted between
trying to get maximum recovery for the class and trying to protect its ongoing investment in
the corporation”).
135.
Cf. Black & Gross, supra note 84, at 992 (noting that arbitration awards “do
not serve as precedent—future arbitration panels cannot rely on previous awards as a source
of authority”).
136.
One potential exception to the above description would be if institutions
pursued, or if defendants consented to, consolidated arbitration cases. Consolidated
arbitration is distinct from class arbitration. In class arbitration, as with the class action, selfselected lead plaintiffs represent others seeking similar recoveries. Park, supra note 49 at
847 (“In ‘class’ arbitration, self-selected claimants represent others entitled to similar or
analogous recovery.”). Consolidation involves independent but related actions that may
involve representation by the same counsel, but with no entity representing any other. Id. In
one recent case, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts v. BCS Insurance Co., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to hear an interlocutory appeal from a
defendant seeking to deconsolidate an arbitration proceeding, reasoning that, under Animal
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For similar reasons, disclosure-only settlements in mergers and
acquisitions (“M&A”) cases will likely die with the class action. In such actions,
plaintiff shareholders obtain additional disclosure about the deal in the proxy
statement.137 Theoretically, such disclosures allow shareholders to make a betterinformed decision about whether to vote in favor of the merger. In practice, such
settlements have been widely derided as frivolous.138 The additional disclosures
are often economically insignificant.139 A recent study found that 85% of all
transactional class actions result in disclosure-only settlements, and that additional
disclosures have no measurable impact on shareholder voting.140 This undermines

Feeds, it could not proceed in consolidated form without the defendant’s consent. 671 F.3d
635, 636–38 (7th Cir. 2011). The court denied the appeal on procedural grounds, pointing to
the movants’ failure to raise the issue at the outset of the arbitration, prior to selection of the
first arbitrator. Id. at 638. Professors Myriam Gilles and Anthony Sebok have pointed out
that, “the rules governing the dominant arbitral bodies do not provide for consolidation of
related cases before a single arbitrator, nor is there any intra-arbitration res judicata effect
awarded to prior victories.” Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd Classing Individual
Arbitrations In A Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 449 (2012). Arbitrators
could also decide to grant prior arbitration awards preclusive effect, but they are not
required to do so. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 671 F.3d at 639 (“Not even BCS denies that a
panel of arbitrators could resolve one plan’s claim and then apply that decision to the others
via doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”); see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way
Emps. v. Burlington N. R.R., 24 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1994); Prod. & Maint. Emps. v.
Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1990). Consolidation is available under the rules
of the London Court of International Arbitration or the International Chamber of
Commerce, and may remain a viable option, as indicated in Blue Cross Blue Shield. See
LCIA Rules, Art. 22; ICC Rules, Art. 10; Blue Cross Blue Shield, 671 F.3d at 640. Boards
revising their corporate bylaws to require arbitration of claims against them or the company
will likely draft those bylaws to bar the possibility of consolidation, thereby eliminating
negative-value claims. Permitting consolidation would defeat the purpose of adopting the
clause in the first place, because, in this context, the purpose of such clauses is not to shift
shareholder litigation from courts to arbitrators, but to eliminate the claims altogether by
undermining their economic viability. Yet it is possible that companies facing simultaneous
arbitrations against large institutional investors might waive their right to oppose
consolidation vis-à-vis those investors if it reduced their own costs to do so. Should this
occur, some corporate governance reform in litigation/arbitration might be preserved,
should the consolidated institutions choose to pursue it in this context.
137.
See generally Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorney’s Fee Awards: The
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only
Statements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 676–81 (2013).
138.
Id. at 689 (discussing the court’s criticism of disclosure-only settlements).
139.
Id. at 674 (“[T]he Court has noted that there is a disturbing trend where
plaintiffs viciously attack a deal and then settle for only marginal disclosures . . . .
Additional criticism targets the problem that deal litigation often nitpicks otherwise good
disclosures.”).
140.
Steven Davidoff Solomon, et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
24),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398023.
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the argument that such disclosures are value enhancing.141 Even if one takes the
view that such disclosure-only settlements are value enhancing, it is difficult to
discern how they would remain economically feasible without the class action
device. Because of the evidence suggesting that such disclosure is likely useless,
elimination of such suits is an argument in favor of mandatory-arbitration or feeshifting provisions. For similar reasons, amendment lawsuits would also be
eliminated in arbitration. In amendment suits, the defendants amend the terms of
the merger agreement, presumably to make it easier for a second bidder to
emerge.142 The literature on such suits is more favorable than disclosure-only suits,
although it is difficult to price their actual value, and hence difficult to assess the
harm caused by their loss.143 Moving beyond disclosure and amendment
settlements, clearly meritorious M&A litigation that results in an increase in price
for target shareholders might also face extinction in the face of mandatoryarbitration provisions. Part of the problem stems from loss of the class action, and
part from the loss of access to courts. Most of the plaintiffs’ leverage in deal
litigation derives from the threat of obtaining a court-ordered injunction
postponing the shareholder vote, without which the deal cannot close. Deals often
cannot close without shareholder approval, and thus the threat of an injunction
may make defendants improve the offer price or make concessions regarding the
bidding process.144 Denial of the injunction means the deal will most likely close
without a remedy for shareholders, leaving only the ex post remedies of litigation.
Arbitrators lack the power to issue injunctions (unless the parties grant them that
power), thereby depriving plaintiff shareholders of their strongest leverage. Even if
an arbitrator would be empowered to issue an injunction, it is not clear how a
single institutional investor—acting alone, rather than in a representative
capacity—would have standing to enjoin a shareholder vote, which is a class-wide
remedy. Finally, even if a single institution could obtain such an injunction in the
face of a loser-pays or plaintiff-pays provision, the free-rider problem persists:
there is no incentive for a single institutional investor to incur all litigation costs in
order to benefit all other investors, including its competitors. Instead, it will pursue
a monetary claim on its own behalf alone, if at all. Such funds might shift into
bringing appraisal claims.145
141.
Cain & Solomon, supra note 120 (manuscript at 16) (discussing “the
principle that ‘disclosure-only’ settlements are not highly valued by the litigant participants
or the courts”); see also Solomon et al., supra note 140 (manuscript at 4).
142.
Solomon et al., supra note 140 (manuscript at 3).
143.
Id.
144.
Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving
Mergers and Acquisitions, Review of 2012 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH
(February 2013), https://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-a8fc4ec4182dedd6/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-Acqui.aspx.
145.
Shareholders who abstained or voted no in a merger agreement have the
option of foregoing the merger consideration and filing an appraisal claim requesting a
judicial proceeding to determine the fair value of their shares. See Charles Korsmo & Minor
Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2015)
(manuscript
at
23),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424935.
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Beyond loss of the injunction, the dynamics of M&A litigation remain
largely similar to those described for securities-fraud litigation above, with one
potentially significant difference. In contrast to fraud litigation, deal litigation is
about deprived gains, not incurred losses. To the extent that loss aversion146 makes
trustees, fund participants, and beneficiaries more sensitive to frauds than reduced
premiums, marginally positive deal cases may be less likely to be brought than
marginally positive fraud cases. This dynamic may already exist under the status
quo. Otherwise, the institutional dynamics remain quite similar in both deal and
fraud cases. As I found in a prior study, public-pension and labor-union funds are
more likely attain lead-plaintiff appointments in deal cases,147 and in a post-classaction world would likely continue to be the most active participants—be it pursuit
of breach of fiduciary duty or perhaps appraisal claims in the arbitration context.
The latter would not be unprecedented; witness T. Rowe Price’s recent pursuit of
appraisal in the management buyout of Dell.148 Recent evidence suggests that
mutual funds have increasingly brought appraisal actions. 149 Hedge funds have
also become active appraisal litigants, prompting questions about the rise of
“appraisal arbitration” as a viable trading strategy.150 Appraisal is a narrow
remedy, potentially offering a higher price to shareholders who believe they were
paid too little for their shares, but depriving them of the potential to stop a deal, or
to improve the informational environment for shareholders. 151
Thus, mandatory arbitration eliminates negative-value claims, and even
certain substantive claims and remedies by positive-value claimants. Apart from
eliminating types of claims, it is important to note what else disappears with loss
of the class action. To the extent that arbitration provisions keep these actions out
of court, or that plaintiff-pays provisions keep these actions from being heard in
any forum, many of the positive externalities of litigation disappear or are
substantially limited. First and foremost is the production of a relevant, current,
and vibrant body of corporate case law, described by one commentator as the
“decree effect.”152 As has so often been observed, the ongoing publication of legal
146.
Loss aversion is the principle that people prefer avoiding loss to acquiring
gains. Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 838 (2012).
147.
Webber, Pay to Play, supra note 114, at 2033 (“In recent years, [public
pension] funds, or their sister union funds, have obtained as much as forty percent of leadplaintiff appointments in securities class actions.”).
148.
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A New Form of Shareholder Activism Gains
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 5, 2014, at B5 (noting that “about 2.7 percent of shareholders
exercised appraisal rights [against Dell], including T. Rowe Price”).
149.
See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 145.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 723–24
(2006) (describing this as the “decree effect”: “The legal principle developed in the case
will create more certainty in structuring social behavior and lower the need for future
adjudication concerning the decided issue. If future litigation does arise, the decree from the
initial case will serve as stare decisis, hence making resolution of later cases more efficient.
Beyond these general legal effects, the decree in the initial case could also be used to
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opinions offers guidance to lawyers, businesses, and transaction planners of all
types on how to structure their conduct or their clients’ conduct. 153 The skill of the
Delaware judiciary in interpreting and developing a body of corporate law has
been cited as a key factor in the reason why half of U.S. public companies
incorporate there, and why many states cite Delaware law as authoritative in
construing their own corporate-law codes. Arbitration is private as are opinions
issued by arbitrators, thereby eliminating the decree effect of litigation. And while
it is true that most civil actions settle, undermining the decree effect of litigation,
settled lawsuits still produce meaningful opinions on motions to dismiss or
summary judgment motions, for example. Actually arbitrated cases would still
have settlement effects, albeit ones that disproportionately favor large institutional
investors with positive-value claims over smaller investors with negative-value
claims, as discussed in Part V.154 And settlement effects obviously disappear to the
extent that arbitration or plaintiff-pays provisions render previously economically
viable actions unviable. Litigation also has “threat effects” to the extent that the
mere threat of suit, and its attendant costs, affects actors. 155 And finally litigation
has institutional effects, in that it leads to the creation of a plaintiffs bar whose
existence would be threatened by loss of the class action. I discuss this final point
in detail in Part IV, where, I also discuss what would remain of shareholder
litigation (or arbitration) if the class action disappeared.

preclude re-litigation of factual issues in future cases among the same or similarly situated
litigants. And most immediately, the decree may actually require a party to cease a practice
affecting a group of individuals, even though the initial case was prosecuted by only one of
them. An individual lawsuit that produces a judicial decision thereby has generated
significant social benefits in terms of shaping conduct, reducing litigation costs, and
preserving judicial resources.”).
153.
See, e.g., id. at 723 (“[Litigation] establishes rules of conduct designed to
shape future conduct, not only the present disputants' but also other people's.”).
154.
See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 152, at 724 (defining “settlement effects”:
“[I]f one litigant successfully challenges a policy that affects many persons, a defendant
may agree to change its behavior as to the entire class. Even if a defendant does not agree as
a formal matter to change its general policy as a consequence of the initial case, it may
nonetheless do so informally lest it be faced with repeated lawsuits . . . The converse is true
as well: shared information about a weak settlement may deter future litigants. Similarly,
settlements by some defendants within an industry could encourage other
defendant/competitors to settle. The information externalities of settlements are well known
and account for much of the attempt to both publicize and keep confidential such
information . . . .” (citing Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the
Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 663
(2001))).
155.
Id. (“The risk of litigation is a cost that parties must factor into decisionmaking in any sphere.” (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970))).
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B. How the Fiduciary Duty of Prudence Leads to a Duty to Investigate and
Bring a Positive-Value Claim Under Trust Law and ERISA
Under trust law generally, and under ERISA in particular, trustees owe
beneficiaries the duties of loyalty and prudence.156 The duty of prudence requires
that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.157

The duty of loyalty requires that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”158
Courts have found that when “supervising pension assets, plan trustees have
fiduciary obligations described as ‘the highest known to the law.’”159 Review of
fiduciary decisions under ERISA has become more stringent in recent years. Up
until 1989, ERISA fiduciaries’ actions were reviewed under the highly deferential
“arbitrary or capricious” standard where there was no conflict of interest. 160 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,161 the Supreme Court rejected this
deferential standard, stating that it was not supported by the text of ERISA. 162 “In
evaluating fiduciaries’ administration of ERISA plans, courts have typically
applied the stricter, statutory standard of care, limiting the applicability of the more
lenient, arbitrary and capricious standard only to cases where the legality of the
trustees’ benefit determination was at issue.”163 In the remainder of Part II, I
outline how these duties, particularly the duty of care, have led courts to find that
fund trustees have a duty to investigate and litigate positive-value claims on behalf
of fund participants and beneficiaries.

156.
George Gleason Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees, in BOGERT’S
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2014) (“Perhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that
he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests
of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interest of
third persons.”).
157.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012).
158.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012).
159.
Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Donovan
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)).
160.
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Ret. Program for Salaried Emps., 740 F.2d
454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[A court’s review of trustees’ decisions] is limited to a
determination of whether the trustees’ actions in administering or interpreting a plan’s
provisions are arbitrary and capricious.”).
161.
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
162.
Id. at 113–14 (“Adopting [a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard]
would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.”).
163.
Ches v. Archer, 827 F. Supp. 159, 165 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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1. The Duty to Investigate Potentially Positive-Value Claims
For fund beneficiaries to succeed on a duty to investigate claim, showing
the trustee’s inaction with respect to a potential claim is sufficient. For example, in
Donovan v. Brians,164 a trustee failed to take any action to recover a delinquent
loan. The court evaluated the trustee’s behavior according to a “reasonable efforts”
standard in investigating the claim. 165 In finding that the trustee failed to meet the
“reasonable efforts” standard, the court shifted the burden to the defendant to show
that the trust would not have recovered the loss to the trust even if it exerted
“reasonable efforts.”166 Other courts have made similar findings. In Ches v.
Archer,167 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
“[t]he officers’ apparent failure to investigate available options for recovering
delinquent contributions to the plan . . . would, if proven, have shown a breach of
fiduciary duties.”168 The court stated that failure to investigate the possibility of a
lawsuit and/or other actions would represent a breach of fiduciary duty. 169
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that “trustees have
a duty to investigate the relevant facts, to explore alternative courses of action and,
if in the best interests of the plan participants, to bring suit against the
employer.”170 Thus, the duty to investigate potentially positive-value claims is
clearly established. Note that once plaintiffs establish this failure to investigate, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the trustee would not have been
successful in the suit.171 Barring such a showing, the trustee who fails to
investigate will be found liable for breaching its duty of care.
Trustees have successfully defended against failure to sue claims by: (1)
establishing a paper trail documenting their deliberations over whether to bring the
claim; (2) concluding that the claim would not be in the best interests of the trust
for a variety of reasons—including that the lawsuit would disrupt the functioning
of the trust, create bad publicity, or discourage qualified trustees from seeking the
position; and (3) explaining that the decision not to bring suit was based in part on
anticipated legal fees and the uncertainty of victory.172 In short, trustees are

164.
566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
165.
Id. at 1262.
166.
Id. at 1265 (“Once failure to make reasonable efforts to recover the loan has
been established, the burden of persuasion is on the defendants to show the loss to the plan
would have occurred even if they had.”).
167.
827 F. Supp. 159.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 167.
170.
McMahon v. McDowell,794 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir. 1986).
171.
See Ches, 827 F. Supp. at 165.
172.
See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Karmgard, 22 Cal. App. 4th 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Axelrod v. Giambalvo, 472 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (ruling in favor of the
defendants where defendants’ affidavits stated in part that the lawsuit would be a
“disruption to the Trust’s orderly procedure,” be bad for publicity, and “the benefits which
might be achieved for the Trust could not possibly compensate for the time and expense of
litigation”).
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justified in declining to sue if they have reason to believe that the claim is negative
value.
Under the duty to investigate, fiduciaries must institute procedures to
detect potentially positive-value claims. The ostrich approach will not work: a
trustee cannot avoid litigating a positive-value claim by blinding herself to its
existence. Such procedures themselves incur costs, and while these should not be
overstated, they would likely increase in a post-class-action world. Under the
current legal regime, institutions should monitor their own portfolios for their
exposure to class action claims.173 The duty actually requires fund fiduciaries to
monitor their portfolios for potential claims, not simply to monitor their portfolios
for existing class action claims that have already been filed. But there is little
evidence suggesting that a fund would have a securities-fraud or transactional
claim against a public company for which no class action has been filed.174 Today,
custodial banks and class action monitoring services conduct most ongoing
monitoring for fiduciaries. These institutions do not independently assess claims
available to the portfolio and, instead, they track claims in existing class actions.175
Nonlawyer portfolio monitors, or custodial banks that provide such services for
institutional clients, monitor filed class actions (both domestically and,
increasingly, internationally) and determine whether their clients are class
members. If so, they also determine how much their clients ought to claim from
the settlement.176
Under the current legal regime, should the institution identify a claim, the
decision to file a claim form in a settled class action is obvious.177 It requires a
173.
Cox & Thomas, supra note 107, at 445 (“All institutions should seriously
reevaluate their systems, and . . . most institutions should consider adopting more aggressive
monitoring systems.”).
174.
See generally Cain & Solomon, supra note 120.
175.
Securities class action recovery firms such as Financial Recovery
Technologies, Battea, and ISS’ Securities Class Action Services do not independently
analyze securities for potential class actions. Instead, they maintain databases of both active
and settled class actions against which they match an institutional investor’s trading history
to identify potential claims. See, e.g., FIN. RECOVERY TECH., What We Do,
http://frtservices.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also ISS SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SERVICES, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/securitiesclass-action-services/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014); see also BATTEA, What We Do,
http://www.battea.com/what-we-do/wwd-class-action-data-processing.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2014). This portfolio analysis then enables the firms to submit claims on behalf of
the institutional investor in the existing active and settled class actions. Id. The situation is
different for funds whose portfolios are monitored by plaintiffs’ lawyers, in which case the
lawyers search portfolios for 10b-5 losses or exposure to transactional claims to find eligible
lead plaintiff applicants. As I will argue below, one possible consequence of declining class
actions would be increased portfolio monitoring of this type, seeking out positive-value
claims, not lead-plaintiff applicants.
176.
FIN. RECOVERY TECH., supra note 175.
177.
See Cox & Thomas, supra note 107 at 424–25 (stating that there are
substantial returns for submitting claims in settled securities class actions, providing
significant returns at little cost).
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relatively quick calculation to determine the size of the claim, followed by the cost
of a postage stamp to mail in the claim form. The costs of attorneys’ fees are baked
into the claim.178 Because the class action has been filed, the institution knows
exactly where to look to identify the size of its exposure. It requires comparatively
little independent legal or financial analysis. 179 And, as noted earlier, there is little
(but not zero) reason to fear judicial second-guessing of the decision to file a claim
in the settled class action instead of opting out and bringing a separate action,
though one might question whether this should be the case, given the prospects for
greater recoveries in an opt-out action and the size of some of the losses for which
institutions only file claim forms. Still, current practices largely insulate these
decisions unless the firm would be settling other unique claims it has against the
defendant by accepting its pro rata share of the settlement.180
In the absence of a class action, the decision-making landscape shifts
considerably. The first question becomes how an institution (or a third-party
portfolio monitor) should search for potential claims in its portfolio (or how, given
that it does not have filed class actions to tell it where to look). In fraud cases, the
fund might examine large losses it incurred in a particular stock. Echoing the
stock-drop cases of the pre- (and some would say post-) PSLRA era, substantial
losses in any holding should automatically trigger an examination of whether the
losses could have been caused by fraud. 181 Smaller losses are less likely to yield
positive-value claims. That said, large institutional investors with scores of outside
managers might not automatically be aware that they have such losses. Press
reports, governmental investigations, and information about litigations or
arbitrations initiated by other funds should trigger the funds to examine their own
portfolios for exposure to potentially meritorious claims. Even so, looking for
stock drops alone is insufficient because plaintiffs can recover for gains they were
deprived of by fraud.182 In the transactional context, funds should automatically
examine their exposure to transactions over a particular dollar threshold, ones in
which the fund held a substantial stake. For example, California State Teachers’
178.
See Russell Kamerman, Securities Class Action Abuse: Protecting Small
Plaintiffs’ Big Money, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 853, 889 n.65 (2007) (“Generally, however,
attorney fees in class actions are usually between 20–30% of the amount recovered, but it is
not uncommon for the fee to reach 50%.”).
179.
While it is theoretically the case that an institution could have a positivevalue claim in which no class action has been filed, failure to detect and bring such an
action could be all the monitoring that is required under the current legal regime—including
class actions—in the monitoring of filed class actions.
180.
Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2009).
181.
See, e.g., Reed v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (S.D. Tex.
1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts throughout the United States have held
that a sharp drop in the price of stock triggers an investor’s duty to make diligent inquiry to
discover the existence of possible fraud.”).
182.
See In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 349 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(“In a fraud on the market case, a plaintiff must show that, as a result of alleged
misrepresentations and in reliance on an honest market, the plaintiff purchased shares
which, when the alleged fraud was revealed, were worth less than the plaintiff had paid for
those same shares.”) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988)).
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Retirement System maintains a policy of seeking lead-plaintiff appointments in
cases in which its stake is greater than $5 million, although it is the second-largest
fund in the country and would therefore be expected to maintain a high absolute
threshold for litigation.183 Similarly, press reports or other publicly available
information about actions brought by other institutional plaintiffs in the
transactional context—including arbitrations or appraisal claims—should trigger
an examination of the fund’s position in the target’s stock. It may well be the case
that, without a class action, institutional investors will have to deploy claimsmonitoring systems to monitor their portfolios, similar to the practice used by
plaintiffs’ lawyers that are seeking out claims. In that case, lawyers themselves
may need to be involved in the monitoring.
2. The Duty to Bring a Positive-Value Claim
Generally, under trust law, a trustee’s failure to pursue a “valuable” legal
claim is a breach of fiduciary duty. 184 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts states: “A
beneficiary may maintain a proceeding related to the trust or its property against a
third party only if . . . the trustee is unable, unavailable, unsuitable, or improperly
failing to protect the beneficiary’s interest.”185 The beneficiaries have standing to
sue fund trustees and the third party that committed the tort. 186 Case law supports
the assertions made in the Restatement and treatises. 187 For example, the Court of
Appeals of Utah held that beneficiaries may “bring an action against a third party
when the beneficiary’s interests are hostile to those of the trustee,” and noted that
many other jurisdictions also allow for beneficiary standing—consistent with the
Restatements.188 Likewise, ERISA fiduciaries generally have a fiduciary duty to
pursue valuable claims of the plan.189

183.
Webber, Pay-to-Play supra note 114, at 2040.
184.
Tittle v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.),
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 555 n.60 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“In Harris Trust . . . the Supreme Court
turned to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts as its source for the common law of trusts.”).
185.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 107 (2012) (emphasis added).
186.
N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338
(D.N.J. 1998) (stating that fiduciaries of trust funds are obliged to sue perpetrators of fraud
directed at the fund).
187.
See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1030,
1037 (1999) (“California has adopted the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
section 282, subdivision (2), which states that ‘[i]f the trustee improperly refuses or neglects
to bring an action against the third person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity
against the trustee and the third person.’”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 282
(1959)).
188.
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (citing Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Booth v.
Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp. 755, 761 (D.N.J. 1957); Hoyle v. Dickinson, 155 Ariz.
277, 279, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Apollinari v. Johnson, 104 Mich. Ct. App.
673, 305 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1981)).
189.
See Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding
that among the general “prudent man” standards, the fiduciary has a “duty to take
reasonable steps to realize on claims held in trust”); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485
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Note that treatises and case law reference the idea of a “valuable” claim,
or a claim in the “best interests” of plan participants.190 Although these sources do
not specifically define what constitutes a “valuable” or “best interests” claim, it is
implicit that these terms reference positive-value claims. Positive-value claims are
claims whose expected value is positive once accounting for the probability of
winning, the anticipated award, and litigation or arbitration costs.191 It would be
irrational for treatises and case law to support the bringing of claims that, for
example, were strong on the merits, but which involved paltry damages and high
litigation costs that ultimately outweighed the suit’s reward. Such claims could be
meritorious, but they are neither “valuable” nor in the “best interests” of plan
participants and beneficiaries because they would leave the latter worse off than if
the claim had never been brought. Thus, for example, Comment C to § 177 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that a trustee will not be liable for failing to
bring a cause of action “if it is reasonable not to bring such an action, owing to the
probable expense involved in the action or to the probability that the action would
be unsuccessful or that if successful the claim would be uncollectible owing to the
insolvency of the defendant or otherwise.”192 Whether such a calculation is
“reasonable” will undoubtedly be shaped by the trustees’ degree of risk aversion.
Furthermore, as noted above, other considerations like legal fees, publicity
concerns, and concerns about whether the litigation would disrupt the core
operations of the fund, may all be taken into account in weighing the value of the
claim.193
So far, courts have been reluctant to find that trustees have breached the
duty of care by failing to bring a positive-value claim. The legal risk to fiduciaries
for failing to investigate appears to be higher than the risk of failing to litigate, so
long as it is clear that the decision not to litigate resulted from a deliberative
process. However, the litigation posture of almost all of the “failure to sue” cases
is one in which courts would be less likely to find a breach of duty than in the
F. Supp. 629, 641 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (finding that by failing to take any action to recover on
outstanding notes, the trustee breached his fiduciary duty); Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp.
2d 39, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (“When, as in this case, a plan has potential claims against a third
party, the ‘trustees have a duty to investigate the relevant facts, to explore alternative
courses of action, and, if in the best interests of the plan participants, to bring suit . . . .’”
(quoting McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir. 1986))).
190.
See Harris, 602 F. Supp 2d at 55.
191.
“For example, a victim of wrongful conduct will have an incentive to file an
individual suit when the expected recovery exceeds the cost of the litigation.” Linda
Sandstrom Simard, A View From Within the Fortune 500: An Empirical Study of Negative
Value Class Actions and Deterrence, 47 IND. L. REV. 739, 742 (2014) (explaining what a
positive-value claim is).
192.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 177 cmt. C (“When trustee need not
bring an action. It is not the duty of the trustee to bring an action to enforce a claim which is
a part of the trust property if it is reasonable not to bring such an action, owing to the
probable expense involved in the action or to the probability that the action would be
unsuccessful or that if successful the claim would be uncollectible owing to the insolvency
of the defendant or otherwise.”).
193.
See discussion supra p. 230.
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shareholder-litigation context. Almost all of the relevant cases contained claims
brought against trustees who failed to sue an employer or plan sponsor that did not
make required contributions to the pension fund.194 These cases implicate the duty
of loyalty in addition to the duty of care because ERISA trustees often serve as
sponsor managers too.195 Courts have been reluctant to find liability against
trustees in this context because the defendant trustees had other means available to
enforce their beneficiaries’ rights.196 In addition to suing the delinquent employer,
trustees may randomly audit the employer’s records, threaten work stoppages,
picket the employer, or engage in other actions depending upon the
circumstances.197 When trustees have several options to remedy the beneficiaries’
harm, courts do not find a broad-based duty to litigate.198
The shareholder-litigation context is different in several key ways. First,
unlike the cases just described, it is less likely that a claim for breach of the duty of
loyalty would play a prominent role in shareholder litigation. A pension trustee
who also serves as a company manager faces a clear loyalty conflict, and a
decision to favor the company over the trust by failing to bring a positive-value
claim for the trust against the company, leaves a trustee exposed to a claim that she
failed to make that decision “solely in the interest[s] of participants and
beneficiaries and [for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits].”199 The same
decision by a trustee in the context of a tort committed by a third party, like a
securities fraud, is less fraught with loyalty concerns. Although claims like these
always turn on the particular facts of the case, a trustee’s loyalties are less likely to
be questioned in the context of a fraud committed, or poor deal terms offered, by
third parties other than the plan sponsor.
The analysis for breach of the duty of care comes out differently. As
noted above, plan participants and beneficiaries have forms of recourse other than
litigation against a recalcitrant plan sponsor. Consequently, courts have been
reluctant to find trustees liable for breach of the duty of care for failing to bring a
positive-value claim.200 Yet in the shareholder-litigation context, participants and
194.
See, e.g., Hartline v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 134 F. Supp.
2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Under ERISA, trustees have a fiduciary duty to ‘act to ensure that
a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled, so that those funds can be used on behalf of
participants and beneficiaries.’” (citation omitted)); McDowell, 794 F.2d at 112 (“Indeed,
whenever an employer seeks to avoid making its pension plan payments . . . trustees have a
duty to investigate the relevant facts, to explore alternative courses of action and, if in the
best interests of the plan participants, to bring suit against the employer.”) (citing Bierworth
and N.J. Brewery)); Herman v. Mercantile Bank, N.A., 137 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1998).
195.
See Hartline, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18.
196.
Id. at 17 (“There is no duty to take any particular course of action if another
approach seems preferable.”) (citing Alfarone v. Bernie Wolff Constr. Corp., 788 F.2d 76,
79–80 (2d Cir. 1986)).
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
200.
See, e.g., Alfarone v. Bernie Wolff Constr. Corp., 788 F.2d 76, 79–80 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that a trustee’s refusal to file a suit to recover contributions alone does
not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty).
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beneficiaries have no form of recourse against a third-party fraudster or against
boards that breach the standard set forth in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.201 of failing to maximize share price in a merger. Litigation is their
only option, and plaintiff beneficiaries will have a comparatively easy time
distinguishing the prior cases that have tilted against finding a breach in this
context.
Thus, the answer to whether funds will bring an independent shareholder
action when there is no class option will depend, in large part, upon the trustees’
assessment of whether the potential claim is positive. This leads to an empirical
question as to how many funds would be likely to have positive-value claims, and
what types of funds might be inclined to bring them. Litigating shareholder
lawsuits is expensive and time consuming. Potential plaintiffs’ exposure to any one
fraud or any one transaction may be relatively small, and these suits tend to be of
negative value when accounting for legal fees and costs—though recovery of such
fees and costs is available to plaintiffs, and might remain so in a post-class-action
environment.202 For example, among public-pension funds, the top 50 or so with
assets in excess of $10 billion would be most likely to have positive-value
claims.203 These funds would be likely to incur either substantial losses in
securities frauds, or have significant exposures to transactions, that might make a
claim worthwhile.
As stated earlier, what shareholder litigation (or arbitration) would look
like without class actions depends on two critical questions: how many funds will
have positive-value claims, and how sizable are those claims likely to be? These
questions are worthy of comprehensive empirical study in a separate empirical
project. To attain an informal sense of whether it is plausible to believe that any
funds would have positive-value claims, I spoke with the heads of two portfoliomonitoring companies that monitor their clients’ claims in existing class actions.
On October 20, 2014, I interviewed Michael Egan, the president and founder of
Class Action Claims Management, based in Charlotte, North Carolina. 204 He told
me that one of his clients had a $350 million loss in the Schering-Plough/Merck
shareholder class action. He described the process the company went through in
deciding whether to opt out of the class action, and the ultimate decision not to
remain in the class. According to Egan, the client’s legal department wanted to opt
out, but the portfolio managers were more reluctant to do so—in part because the
losses reflected performance from years before, and also because the company had
no systems in place for making this decision. In the end, the company decided to
just file a claim form in the class action. But according to Egan, having gone
through the opt-out process once, the company has now developed a system for
making such a decision the next time, and it has identified the people who need to

201.
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
202.
See Simard, supra note 191.
203.
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 114, at 2046, n.60.
204.
Interview with Michael Egan, President and Founder of Class Action Claims
Management, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 20, 2014); see also, CLASS ACTION CLAIMS, About
Us, https://www.securitiesclaims.com/page/about_us_main.html.
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be part of the decision-making process. Egan thinks the company has “warmed up”
to the idea of opting out, and that it will do so next time. The company has
established a $50 million threshold for doing so.
Egan also told me that clients with assets ranging $10–$50 billion should
have sufficient claims to opt out—or, for purposes of this paper, to bring an
arbitration—if the class action route was no longer available. Such clients, he
stated, “could easily have claims in the $10–$20 million range,” not only because
of their size, but because they tend to have more concentrated investments than
funds in the range of $100 billion or more in assets. Egan told me that he had
multiple clients with losses in the range of $30–$50 million in securities class
actions against Hewlett Packard, JP Morgan, and the Citigroup Bonds class
action.205
I also spoke with the CEO of another claims-monitoring firm, who wishes
to remain anonymous. He emailed me the following on March 30, 2014:
As promised, I could give you some quick anecdotal info regarding
client losses in potential actions . . . [I]n the last six months we’ve
looked at at least 3 cases where we thought clients with large losses
might consider opting out, and so I can tell you that, for instance, in
[the] Massey Energy [class action] we had 5 client[s] with losses
between $8 m[illion] and $16 m[illion] each. In [the] Facebook
[class action] we had one client with close to $20 m[illion] in losses.
And in [the] Best Buy [class action] we had more than 10 clients
with losses between $1 and $10 m[illion].
I know we’ve had instances where the losses were more substantial
than this, but I can’t recall the exact numbers . . . . But this gives
you a sense that at least among [our] clients . . . the losses often
exceed $5 m[illion] if not a multiple of that.206

While the above statements do not resolve the empirical questions I pose,
they do suggest that the number of institutional investors with positive-value
claims could be substantial enough to maintain the viability of at least some
shareholder litigation outside the class action context. In assessing the economic
viability of such actions, firms must inquire into the total damages claimed and the
litigation costs.
It is clear that, because small claims become economically unviable
outside the class context, the total damages claimed would be reduced in a postclass-action world. Moreover, because the threat of fiduciary liability for close
calls is low, and the hassle of litigation too great, many marginally positive-value
claims might similarly vanish. It is tempting to think that reduced damage claims
will necessarily lead to reduced damages, but some caution is merited here.
Currently, total recoveries in securities class actions hover in the pitiful range of
205.
Interview with Michael Egan, supra note 204.
206.
E-mail from Anonymous to David H. Webber, Associate Professor of Law,
Boston University School of Law (March 30, 2014) (on file with author) (firm name
redacted).).
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7% of damages claimed.207 Yet there have been several class actions from which
institutional investors have opted out and recovered a far higher percentage of their
damages.208 Several institutions claim to have recovered 100% of their losses from
opting out, and others have claimed recovering far higher damages from opting out
than they would have had they remained in the class action. 209 There are several
reasons why opting out might have resulted in higher recoveries. For instance,
companies might be more willing to pay higher damages to large institutional
investors, like pension funds, that will maintain a substantial stake in the
company.210 It may be that institutional investors are more deeply engaged in
monitoring their counsel and prosecuting the case when they are pursuing a
separate opt-out action, than when they are passive class members or even lead
plaintiffs—though many of the successful opt outs occurred in cases in which
dozens of institutions opted out together, resulting in a quasi-class action. 211
A second issue is litigation costs. As discussed above, for cases to be
positive value, the expected value of the suit must be positive net of legal fees and
costs.212 Currently, litigation costs are quite substantial for both plaintiffs and
defendants. Dealing with the analysis under arbitration provisions first, most

207.
Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1192.
208.
Joseph Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act 9 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working
Paper No. 150, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2317537; see also Blair A.
Nicholas & Ian D. Berg, Why Institutional Investors Opt-Out of Securities Fraud Class
Actions and Pursue Direct Individual Actions, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN
LLP,
1
(2009)
available
at
http://www.blbglaw.com/news/media_menti
ons/00104/_res/id=sa_File1/PLIreprint7_22_09 (“As a recent example, in the Qwest
securities litigation, the total publicly disclosed opt-out settlements exceeded the settlement
of the entire securities class action.”); Stephen Taub, Shareholders Abandon Qwest
Settlement,
CFO,
May
5,
2006,
available
at
http://ww2.cfo.com/riskcompliance/2006/05/shareholders-abandon-qwest-settlement (Bill Lerach, attorney for
plaintiffs who opted out of the WorldCom class action suit: “Our clients’ net recoveries on
their WorldCom bond losses are substantially higher than the estimated recovery for the
same bond losses in the WorldCom class action”); Joshua H. Vinik et al., Why Institutional
Investors Are Opting Out of Class-Action Litigation, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25,
2011, available at http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/PRINTSUB/307259985
(“Sixty-five investors opted out of the $6.1 billion WorldCom class settlement approved in
2005; more than 100 opted out of the $2.65 billion AOL Time Warner securities class
settlement approved in 2006; and more than 288 opted out of the $3.2 billion Tyco
International settlement approved in December 2007.”).
209.
See Nicholas & Berg, supra note 208.
210.
Id. (“Defendant companies understand that institutional investors typically
maintain a long-term position in their company . . . . [I]nstitutional investors can potentially
leverage their size and position to incorporate important governance reforms in a direct
action settlement.”).
211.
Id. (“By opting-out, an institutional investor has complete control over the
prosecution of its own unique claims, including the selection and direction of legal counsel,
negotiation of attorneys’ fees, absolute settlement authority, and utilization of its size and
stature as leverage in settlement negotiations or at trial.”).
212.
See Simard, supra note 191.
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commentators expect that arbitration reduces these costs. 213 The fact that
arbitration would limit recovery for negative-value claims is frequently cited as a
virtue of arbitration because it would eliminate what critics view as frivolous
litigation against companies—litigation that harms shareholders big and small. 214
Also, arbitration claims tend to be resolved more rapidly than litigation, benefitting
plaintiffs who recover earlier and may also pay lower attorneys’ fees on account of
lower costs.215 Greater engagement by shareholders overseeing attorneys in an
individual arbitration may lead to higher recoveries as a percentage of damages
claimed.216 The opportunity to select arbitrators allows parties to choose decisionmakers with relevant legal or judicial experience, rather than expose themselves to
the judicial lottery.217
Still, some commentators have challenged the view that arbitration
reduces litigation costs.218 For defendants, there are several reasons to believe that
such costs may rise in arbitration. First, defendants have no “off ramps” in
arbitration, no motion to dismiss, no motion for class certification, and no motion
for summary judgment. There is no obvious, early opportunity to get rid of
arbitration. Arbitrators are paid hourly, often at high rates, they have no incentive
to end early, and there are usually three of them.219 In contrast, judges with full
dockets have the opportunity, and perhaps the inclination, to grant motions to
dismiss, to deny class certification, or to grant summary judgment motions. Judges
are compensated by taxpayers, rather than by arbitrating parties.
Second, plaintiffs in 10b-5 securities-fraud class actions face a bar on
discovery. While it is true that discovery is generally not available in arbitration,
arbitrators may choose to order it, thus giving plaintiffs discovery that would not
have been available to them in a class action. 220 Third, expensive as it may be to
defend a securities class action, at least that action typically resolves all the claims
at once. In the kind of bilateral arbitration that bars consolidation that corporations
would most likely choose, each party arbitrates separately. Thus, defendant
companies might face dozens of separate arbitrations against large institutional
investors, in dozens of forums stretching out over extended periods of time. Of
213.
Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea of
Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107–08 (2012) (“All proponents
emphasized the traditional benefits of arbitration, namely, a faster, less expensive, and more
flexible process in which arbitrators possessing expertise in the subject matter resolve the
parties’ dispute.”).
214.
Id. at 108, n.5 (“Many [proponents of arbitration] advocated for arbitration as
an antidote to perceived abuses of federal securities class actions.”).
215.
Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1209–10.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
See Black & Gross, supra note 84, at 1004.
219.
Why And When It Might Pay To Arbitrate, WARREN GORHAM & LAMONT,
2000, available at 2000 WL 33990947.
220.
Robert E. Benson, The Power of Arbitrators and Courts to Order Discovery
in Arbitration—Part II, 25 COLO. LAW. 35, 35 (Mar. 1996) (“Indeed, most courts have held
that they do have inherent power to order discovery in aid of arbitration in some
circumstances.”).
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course, if overall recovered damages drop in the presence of arbitration clauses,
then the tradeoff would be worth it, even if arbitration actually increased litigation
costs. But even if both litigation costs and overall costs were to defy expectations
and increase in arbitration, companies might still not drop mandatory-arbitration
provisions because managers might prefer that allegations against them be aired in
confidential arbitration proceedings rather than in open court.
In the deal context, mandatory arbitration would make it impossible for
plaintiffs to enjoin a shareholder meeting, which is the source of much of
plaintiffs’ settlement leverage. This could then shift the focus of institutional
investors to appraisal proceedings. Lately, such proceedings have attracted
increased attention from investors and the loss of a meaningful remedy under
Revlon might force more institutions to seek out appraisal remedies, particularly in
cases where institutional lead plaintiffs have had success in litigating transactional
class actions in the past.221
Plaintiff-pays provisions change the analysis somewhat. The cost of
litigating a claim in court now bears the increased risk of having to assume the
defendants’ costs too.222 On the other hand, a standalone plaintiff-pays provision
would still enable consolidation of claims, and sharing of litigation costs, unless it
were twinned with an arbitration provision. These provisions increase claims costs
even further, and render fewer claims of positive value at the margins, allowing
only the strongest claims to proceed. As noted earlier, while they might reduce the
number of suits, they would also incentivize plaintiffs to vigorously litigate the
cases they do bring to the end.
One would expect that the types of funds that would be most likely to
avoid this litigation would be similar to the ones that avoid lead-plaintiff
appointments now, and for similar reasons. For example, mutual funds avoid
obtaining lead-plaintiff appointments in securities and transactional class actions,
as noted above.223 A mutual fund might have a strong claim for securities fraud
against a Fortune-100 company that utilizes the mutual fund’s platform of 401(k)
offerings for its employees’ retirement savings. Mutual funds would rationally
consider the detrimental impact of a lawsuit or arbitration against the company on
its future business with that company. So might intrafund conflicts in which
different funds might have different stakes in the defendant, or in the deal context,
different stakes in the target and the acquirer. 224 Such considerations could
transform what might otherwise have been a positive-value claim into a negativevalue one, just as they might incline such funds to shun lead-plaintiff
appointments.
But there are meaningful distinctions between obtaining a lead-plaintiff
appointment or opting out of a class action and declining to pursue a claim when

221.
See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 968–69; See also Korsmo &
Myers, supra note 145.
222.
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 145 (manuscript at 10).
223.
Id. (manuscript at 21).
224.
Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 943.
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no other recourse exists. In arbitration, the free-rider problem is neutralized. Only
the arbitrating plaintiff benefits from a settlement or verdict, not a class that
includes the plaintiff’s competitors—who, if they so choose, can arbitrate on their
own behalf.225 Also, arbitration proceedings are confidential, and decisions have
no precedential value, reducing the free-rider problem to something close to
zero.226 Furthermore, while mutual funds would be right to consider their ongoing
business relationship with a potential defendant, and intrafund-family conflicts, it
must occasionally be true that the size of the loss due to fraud must outweigh these
competing considerations and compel a lawsuit. Nor should the costs of suing a
client be overstated. A defendant corporation that removes a mutual fund from its
employees’ 401(k) platform in retaliation for the mutual fund’s credible fraud
claim might face questions about whether the company’s actions are consistent
with its duties of loyalty and prudence it owes to plan participants and
beneficiaries. Similar arguments could be made for banks, insurance companies,
and other institutional investors that currently remain passive in securities and
transactional class actions. These entities have business relationships with
corporate defendants that they will want to safeguard, and which would rightly
count against bringing claims. But the scope of these limitations should not be
overstated, particularly in the face of a substantial fraud.
Still, to the extent that shareholder litigation continues without class
actions, it is likely that its leading participants will remain public-pension funds
and labor-union funds, the same funds that serve as the most frequent lead
plaintiffs today. According to my own research, 127 public-pension funds served
as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions between 2003 and 2006,227 while 32
public-pension funds and 28 labor-union funds served as lead plaintiffs in
Delaware deal cases between 2003 and 2009.228 There have also been a few
instances of cases in which there were a substantial number of opt-outs by
institutional investors that received wide coverage—for example, the In re
Worldcom & Qwest Communications litigation.229 Public-pension funds have a
total of $3 trillion under management.230 As noted earlier, more than 50 publicpension funds manage in excess of $10 billion, making them plausible candidates
to be repeat players with positive-value claims.231 Because they lack many of the
conflicts that other investors do, we might still expect to see them as active players
in shareholder litigation, even without class actions. Labor-union funds have been
similarly active, though they are far smaller on average, and are less likely to have
positive-value claims. Accordingly, they may be less significant players in a postclass-action world than they are now.
225.
Cf. Black & Gross, supra note 84, at 992 (“[Arbitration] awards do not serve
as precedent—future arbitration panels cannot rely on previous awards as a source of
authority.”).
226.
Id.
227.
Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 114, at 2051.
228.
Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 935.
229.
Grundfest, supra note 208; see also Nicholas & Berg, supra note 208.
230.
See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 939, n.21.
231.
See supra text pp. 20–21.
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III. MAPPING THE INSURANCE LANDSCAPE FOR PUBLIC-PENSIONFUND FIDUCIARIES
In this Part, I discuss the somewhat unusual insurance landscape for
fiduciaries of public-pension funds. I raise this point because these funds have
historically been the most active lead-plaintiff participants in transactional class
actions in Delaware, the second most active participants in securities-fraud class
actions, and by far the largest and most successful class representatives, correlating
with better outcomes for shareholders.232 To the extent that any institutions will
remain active in a world of shareholder arbitration instead of litigation, publicpension funds are among the most likely candidates. And because of the arguments
outlined above, demonstrating how such fiduciaries could be held liable for failing
to adequately monitor fund portfolios, or failing to litigate positive-value claims,
the insurance landscape in which they will make litigation decisions is relevant.
This landscape also differs greatly from the world of directors’ and officers’
liability insurance with which most corporate-law academics and practitioners are
familiar.
I recently discussed fiduciary liability insurance for public-pension
trustees with Daniel Aronowitz, managing principal of Euclid Specialty Managers,
LLC—leading provider of such insurance.233 I also discussed this topic with an
executive at one of the leading insurance companies who requested anonymity
(“the Executive”). According to Aronowitz’s estimation, at least half of all U.S.
public-pension plans do not have fiduciary insurance for their board members; he
estimates the actual number of uninsured public-pension plans at more than
60%.234 The Executive concurred with this figure. To the extent it is accurate, this
astonishing percentage of uninsured pension fiduciaries is likely the product of
several factors, according to both Aronowitz and the Executive. First, many of the
largest insurers avoid providing fiduciary insurance for underfunded (less than
80% funded) pension funds for fear that the trustees will be held liable for such
underfunding—as has already occurred in cases like L.I. Head Start Child
232.
C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder
Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356–62 (2010); Perino, supra note 95; Webber, Private
Policing, supra note 95.
233.
I also made inquiries about fiduciary liability insurance for public-pension
funds with two leading insurance companies. One refused to speak with me, and the other
did not reply to my inquiry.
234.
This estimate is based on an internal Euclid calculation, and I have not been
able to identify public sources to check it. Aronowitz says there are no nationwide sources,
though California publicly tracks the issue. Interview with Daniel Aronowitz, Managing
Principal, Euclid Specialty Managers, LLC (Mar. 13, 2014); see also Survey of Fiduciary
Liability
Insurance
Coverage,
STATE UNIV. RET. SYS.,
available
at
http://www.surs.com/pdfs/minutes/x_bot/ex12_02_a.pdf (noting several large pension funds
who do not have fiduciary liability insurance and their reasons for not having such); Salar
Ghahramani, Protecting Public Pension Funds from Divestment-Related Lawsuits:
Exploring the State Laws of the United States, 16 PENSIONS: AN INT’L J. 212 (2011) (noting
that many states do not indemnify fiduciaries for divesting from Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and
Syria, even while requiring these divestments under state law).

2015]

ILEP SYMPOSIUM

245

Development Services, Inc. v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau
County, Inc.235 Similarly, many of the large insurers are wary of writing policies
for these funds because of the liability concerns associated with widespread
changes to benefits in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.236 For example,
the Illinois Teachers Retirement System, which was significantly underfunded
until recently, solicited bids for fiduciary liability insurance coverage from more
than 20 insurance companies.237 In response, only two bothered to offer a quote,
and neither of these were major insurance companies. 238
While obtaining insurance may be difficult for some funds, many funds
also decline to obtain insurance because their state, county, and municipal
sponsors can assert sovereign immunity for public-pension trustees acting within
the scope of their duties.239 Other states waive sovereign immunity and allow
indemnification for fiduciary violations as long as the conduct was not willful or
grossly negligent.240 Unfortunately, neither option offers particularly robust
protection to pension trustees.
First, whether the state or municipality will assert sovereign immunity in
response to any particular lawsuit is not a decision that is made by the pension
board, but usually by the state attorney general or the city attorney. 241 This
235.
710 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming underfunding-related liability
judgment against fund fiduciaries and denying that underfunding claims were barred by the
statute of limitations).
236.
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B. Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good
Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to
Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317 (May 2014).
237.
By November of 2013, it was reported that the “Illinois’ teacher fund is
worth $40 billion, but it is also underfunded by $5 billion.” Benjamin Yount, Disappearing
Pensions? Illinois Teachers Get Halloween Scare, WATCHDOG (Nov. 1, 2013)
http://watchdog.org/113855/disappearing-pensions-illinois-teachers-get-halloween-scare/.
238.
See Interview with Aronowitz, supra note 234.
239.
Id.; see also Interview with Executive (on file with author); FLA STAT. ANN.
§ 768.28 (West 2012) (“No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its
subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any
action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action
in the scope of her or his employment, or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent
acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose . . . .”); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(3)
(McKinney 2014).
240.
Interview with Aronowitz, supra note 234; see e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 768.28
(West 2012); see also Interview with Executive, supra note 239. As an example, the
Chicago Teachers Pension Fund’s Investment Management Agreement includes a clause
that “the Investment Manager shall indemnify and hold harmless the Board of Trustees and
the Fund . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, no indemnified party hereunder shall be
entitled to indemnification to the extent that any such loss was directly caused by the party’s
own gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Investment Management Agreement, CHI.
TEACHERS PENSION FUND 1, 7–8, available at http://www.ctpf.org/general_info/
investments/standard_ima.pdf.
241.
Interview with Aronowitz, supra note 234; see also N.H. REV. STAT ANN. §
99-D:2 (2014) (describing the role of the Attorney General in indemnification cases in New
Hampshire).
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introduces uncertainty and political considerations into the assertion of sovereign
immunity.242 In the most prominent example of this uncertainty, five trustees of the
San Diego County Employees Retirement System were sued in 2005 for breaches
of their fiduciary duties in connection with the city’s inability to fund pensions.243
The defendants were charged with allowing the city to limit funding of the
retirement system while increasing pension payments to city employees, which
included the defendants.244 The City Council and then the City Attorney both
declined to provide a defense for the fiduciaries, who ultimately sued the city to
seek indemnification of their costs.245 Similarly, in Estes v. Anderson,246 plaintiffs
sued the pension-fund trustees of the Detroit General Retirement System, the
Detroit Police and Fire Retirement System, and the systems’ investment advisors,
for gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with investments
by the fund. The defendants pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense. 247 Although
the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed dismissal of most of the plaintiffs’
claims on these grounds, the gross negligence claim survived because immunity
does not extend to gross negligence. 248 Thus, Estes illustrates a clear way to plead
around an immunity defense.
Similar logic applies to indemnification clauses. Typically, these
indemnification clauses are limited by public policy concerns.249 Statutes
governing public-pension funds often preclude indemnification for a wider range
of actions than prohibited in the general trust context, but still allow it in certain
circumstances. In California, public-pension plans are prohibited by statute from
obtaining insurance that will immunize the fiduciary from liability stemming from
its breaches.250 Delaware allows indemnification, but limits it to “[good-faith]

242.
Interview with Aronowitz, supra note 234.
243.
See Euclid Specialty Managers White Paper on Governmental Benefit Plans:
Who pays When a Trustee is Sued?, EUCLID SPECIALTY MANAGERS (May 28, 2013),
available
at
http://www.euclidmanagers.com/pgprofliab/pdfs/esm_
pdfs/The_Euc
lid_Perspective_White_Paper_on_Governmental_Fiduciary_Liability_052813_Final.pdf
[hereinafter Euclid Specialty Managers].
244.
Id. (“Lexin and five other employees on the SDCERS Board were charged
with felony violations of state conflict of interest statutes . . . . The City Attorney alleged
that Lexin and her fellow city employees on the SDCERS Board had voted to authorize an
agreement allowing the City to limit funding of its retirement system in exchange for the
City’s agreeing to provide increased pension benefits to City employees, including
themselves.”); Jennifer Vigil, Aguirre Sues to Shift Control of Pension System, U-T SAN
DIEGO,
July
9,
2005,
http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050709/
news_7m9pension.html (“Aguirre argues that the city did not have the funding to pay for
the new benefits but approved them anyway . . . .”).
245.
Euclid Specialty Managers, supra note 243.
246.
No. 294515, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 2236 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012).
247.
Id. at *5.
248.
Id. at *6.
249.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012); MD. CODE. ANN., State Personnel and
Services § 21-208 (West 2014).
250.
CAL. GOV. CODE § 7511 (West 2014).
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conduct reasonably believed in the ‘best interest’ of the state.”251 Nearly half the
states explicitly authorize indemnification insurance.252 ERISA does not govern
public-pension funds, but it may be cited as persuasive authority in interpreting
state pension codes.253
ERISA demands that trustees be held personally liable for breaches of
fiduciary duty to the plan:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary.254

ERISA prohibits all exculpatory and indemnity provisions that relieve
fiduciaries from their duty or liability as against public policy.255 ERISA, however,
does allow for insuring against breaches of fiduciary duties, conditional upon the
insurance still allowing for ultimate recourse against the fiduciary.256 If this
insurance is purchased by the plan (as opposed to by the employer or the fiduciary
himself), the insurance company must ultimately have recourse against the
fiduciary.257 It is true that the plan may utilize plan assets to purchase insurance for
its trustees, but plan assets may not be used to directly settle liability judgments
against trustees. As mentioned above, public-pension funds are not bound by
ERISA and have taken varied approaches to curtailing and/or indemnifying

251.
See Euclid Specialty Managers, supra note 243, at 5; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 8308 (West 2014).
252.
See Daniel Aronowitz, Trends in Fiduciary Liability 12, ULLICO CASUALTY
GRP. (2010) available at www.fppta.org/Gateway/GetBinaryFile.aspx?FID=240; Euclid
Specialty Managers, supra note 243, at 7 (stating that nearly half of the states expressly
authorize or require fiduciary liability insurance, including Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina,
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia).
253.
See David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2106, 2119–20 (2014).
254.
29 U.S.C. § 1109.
255.
29 U.S.C. § 1110. Indemnification provisions are only null if they relieve a
fiduciary from responsibility or liability. See, e.g, Packer Eng’g, Inc. v. Kratville, 965 F.2d
174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding valid a provision indemnifying the legal costs of
fiduciaries found by a court not to have breached their fiduciary duty).
256.
29 U.S.C. § 1110(b).
257.
29 U.S.C. § 1110(b)(1).

248

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:1

fiduciary liability. Some invoke sovereign immunity as noted above; 258 while other
plans have specific exculpation clauses, indemnification provisions, or both. 259
Thus, plan sponsors could purchase insurance for their trustees, but may
prefer not to assume a cost they view as unnecessary in light of their ability to
shield their trustees from liability by invoking sovereign immunity for all but the
most egregious behavior. As the Executive told me, “[T]hey are reluctant to be
questioned later about expenses that may be mistakenly viewed as unnecessary.”
Thus, pension trustees face a quandary. In the absence of fiduciary liability
insurance, they are only protected if the plan sponsor chooses to protect them. The
lack of predictable insurance coverage may have unpredictable effects on trustee
behavior. A few developments suggest that the dearth and uncertainty of coverage
could prompt trustees, at the margins, to favor litigating over not litigating fraud
and deal cases. First, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, many public-pension
funds have faced unprecedented criticism and scrutiny over underfunding issues. 260
Although pension-fund balance sheets have improved in recent years, many
remain underfunded, and even those that are no longer underfunded operate in a
political environment in which elected officials and voters are newly sensitized to
the dangers of such underfunding. 261 In this environment, doing nothing in the face
of fraud becomes politically risky. Without insurance, the risk of suit for failing to
sue, and certainly for failing to monitor, might incline trustees with nonfrivolous
claims to proceed with such claims. Another development that might affect trustee
decision-making is the recent sharp increase in ERISA litigation, particularly
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits brought on behalf of fund beneficiaries. 262 Large
damages payouts likely lead firms to devote more resources to bringing these
cases, and enable them to develop the war chests required to finance them. 263 They
may seek out similar problems in the public-pension space. Increased stress placed
on retirement funds by the retirement of the Baby Boomers may be a further spur
to such litigation.
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Estes v. Anderson, No. 294515, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 2236 at *4 (Mich.
App. Nov. 15, 2012).
259.
Id. at *5.
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State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, at 191–210 (2009) (criticizing the
current incentive structure that promotes investment in risky but higher-yielding assets).
261.
Id.
262.
See
ERISA
Litigation,
VINSON
&
ELKINS,
http://www.velaw.com/practices/ERISALitigation.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (“The
downturn in the economy has ushered a substantial increase in ERISA litigation . . . . There
is approximately $10 trillion in pension plan assets nationwide, which has spawned a surge
in class action lawsuits against pension plans and their fiduciaries.”).
263.
See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in
Tobacco Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 129 (2001) (“Fees from
Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and various other matters, but above all, asbestos, filled the
war chests of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar.”).
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The dearth and uncertainty of insurance coverage may also result in an
unusually high degree of herding behavior over litigation/arbitration.264 Because of
the threat of personal liability for getting this decision wrong, trustees might best
protect themselves by doing whatever their peer institutions do. It might be
unusual to see cases in which just a few pension funds file suit; rather, we might
see zero arbitrations or a large number of institutional investors bringing
arbitrations.
Of course, a pension trustee could breach her fiduciary duties by filing a
frivolous suit just as much as by failing to file a meritorious one. 265 Undoubtedly,
trustees should be reasonable in documenting why they opted to sue or not. But the
probability that they will be found liable for filing a frivolous suit is extremely low
unless the court states on the record that the suit is frivolous, or there is some type
of sanction. Presumably, the lawyers bringing the suit will also be constrained by
the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.266 It might come down to little more than a
question of who is more likely to sue you: a beneficiary who thinks you failed to
act in the face of fraud, or one who is upset that you tried and failed to recover in
the face of fraud. In the face of uncertainty, trustees may find action more
defensible than inaction.
As discussed more fully below in Part IV, a second development that
could affect trustees is how that bar would respond to loss of the class action
device. These firms are armed with substantial resources they will deploy to
maintain their practices. They will need a broad pool of institutional clients—not
just the largest ones that can win lead-plaintiff appointments, but also those that
are large enough to have positive-value claims. Given the potential for bankruptcy
faced by plaintiff firms without class actions, it is not too farfetched to imagine
that they themselves would target a fund’s trustees for failure to bring suit over a
positive-value fraud claim, perhaps a fund controlled by elected officials who
would be strongly disinclined to become a client of such firms. One can also
imagine good-cop/bad-cop dynamics taking hold. A small firm affiliated with
plaintiff law firms brings an action against trustees for failure to sue, thereby not
soiling the plaintiff firms’ reputation with pension funds, while creating incentives
for funds to monitor and perhaps bring arbitrations of their own.
The insurance environment leaves public-pension trustees unusually
vulnerable to litigation. This is not to suggest that such vulnerability is a bad thing.
It may make such trustees more sensitive to their fiduciary duties than comparable
agents at other funds that are more insulated. The class action has rendered these
trustees largely impervious to claims against them for their portfolio-monitoring
and litigating conduct, perhaps helping to conceal an unusual, and potentially
unstable, insurance situation. Loss of the class action could prompt reform of how
such pension trustees are insured but, in the meantime, it should lead to careful
264.
See Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and
Herding Behavior in Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724, 730–31 (1998)
(discussing herding behavior).
265.
Cf. supra Part II.B.2.
266.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
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portfolio monitoring, prosecution of positive-value claims, and herding behavior
by funds seeking to justify their fiduciary choices through reference to the actions
of other trustees.

IV. HOW LOSS OF THE CLASS ACTION WOULD AFFECT THE
PLAINTIFFS’ BAR
There is a broad array of potential outcomes for the plaintiffs’ bar should
the class action be eliminated, ranging from dissolution to thriving practices
representing institutional investors in shareholder arbitration, to new competition
from traditional law firms. Below, I will sketch out some of the ways that loss of
the class action could impact the plaintiffs’ bar. Before doing so, I note some
recent empirical research on plaintiffs’ law firms that accounts for their quality. In
Zealous Advocates or Self-Interested Actors: Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’
Law Firms in Merger Litigation, C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and
Randall Thomas evaluate 1,739 merger class actions in five states between 2003
and 2012.267 They find that, after controlling for selection bias, top plaintiffs’ law
firms correlate with a higher probability of lawsuit success. 268 They also suggest
that this success stems from more active case prosecution by such firms, more
documents filed, and more motions for an injunction. 269 Similarly, in Law Firm
Quality, Deal Litigation, and Firm Value, Adam Badawi and I study all merger
class actions in Delaware from 2003 to 2008.270 In our event study, we find a
positive market reaction to deal lawsuits filed by top law firms, and a negative
reaction to suits filed by poor quality firms. 271 We find this effect both for
conflicted transactions like management buy-outs and controlling shareholder
transactions.272 As for 10b-5 securities class actions, several studies have found
that institutional investors generally, and public-pension lead plaintiffs in
particular, correlate with better outcomes for shareholders.273 Other studies have
found these results for merger class actions too. 274 In combination, these studies
suggest that at least a subset of this litigation performs as designed and enhances
shareholder value (or at least target shareholder value in deal cases). They also
point to one of the deep flaws of mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting
provisions—they are blunt instruments that threaten meritorious and frivolous suits
alike, high and low quality firms alike.

267.
C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., Zealous Advocates or Self-Interested Actors?
Accessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 1 (European Corp. Gov.
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
265/2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490098.
268.
Id. at 11.
269.
Id. at 25.
270.
David H. Webber & Adam Badawi, Deal Litigation, Law Firm Quality, and
Firm Value, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
273.
See Cheng et al., supra note 232; Perino, supra note 95.
274.
See Adam Badawi & Daniel Chen, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of
Delaware Litigation, (forthcoming); Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95.
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A. The Economic Status Quo for Shareholder and Transactional Litigators
Assessing how loss of the class action would affect the plaintiffs’ bar
requires assessment of why we have a separate plaintiffs’ bar in the first place.
Many practice areas dominated by class actions subdivide into plaintiffs’ and
defense firms, including mass-tort, consumer, antitrust, employment, and
securities/transactional.275 Law-firm economics, path-dependent historical
circumstances, conflicts of interest, and the politics of class actions all explain
these plaintiff/defense schisms. First, class action dynamics, including aggregation
of negative-value claims, tilt in favor of plaintiff-lawyer compensation by
contingency fee because the clients will not rationally pay their legal fees out of
pocket.276 Law firms that are compensated by contingency fees organize
themselves differently than firms compensated under the billable-hour model.
Contingency-fee arrangements require considerable risk taking and reward.277 In
the securities space, it may involve incurring five years (on average) of litigation
expenses with the possibility of zero compensation, or a large payoff that can be
several times the hourly wage of even the most highly compensated partners at
defense firms.278 Plaintiffs’ lawyers select and maintain a portfolio of cases in
various stages of development. Risk taking, managing a portfolio of cases, and
assuming the costs of litigation directly distinguish the economics of plaintiffs’
firms from defense firms. Defense firms mostly operate on the billable-hour
model. They are compensated monthly for legal expenses incurred, and they rarely
assume either the risk or the rewards of the cases they litigate—being compensated
on effort rather than outcomes. While some firms have taken to blending these two
compensation models, for the most part, firms tend to adopt one or the other. A
firm’s choice of a compensation model may be “sticky” in that it may create
incentives within the firm to avoid work that operates on a different billing model.
Beyond compensation dynamics, there are marketing and social-network
reasons why traditional law firms have shunned plaintiff-side class action practice.

275.
Many of these fields are already adjusting to a post-class-action world. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in Concepcion directly applied to the consumer context, and
American Express applied to antitrust.
276.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in
Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 17–18 (1991) (noting that the contingency fee also “partially aligns the interests of lawyer
and client by giving the lawyer an economic interest in the outcome of the case, resulting in
the sharing of risk”).
277.
David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2012) (“[T]he lawyer shares in the litigation risk
because she only receives compensation for her legal work if the client wins the case or
receives a settlement.”).
278.
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 347, 347 (1998) (describing “no win no pay” as a defining characteristic of the
contingency fee); see also About Class Actions, SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & WILLIS,
http://www.srkw-law.com/about-class-actions.html (noting that “[w]hile every case is
different, it is not unusual for a class action to take 2–4 years from the filing of the
complaint to a final resolution”).
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These firms sell their services to large, multinational corporations, offering a full
suite of legal services.279 Transactional services include IPOs, M&A, and corporate
restructurings; litigation services include intercompany lawsuits, defense of
criminal and civil governmental investigations, and other regulatory actions; both
practice areas require related legal service like tax, bankruptcy, trusts and estates,
employment, etc.280 These firms operate globally to meet the demands of their
clients—sometimes with offices in dozens of cities on multiple continents. Suing
these same clients in class actions would fit poorly into this marketing scheme. It
potentially undermines a firm’s pitch to corporate managers when the firm itself
regularly sues such managers on behalf of investors. 281 Perhaps more importantly,
representation of a class against one large multinational corporation could create
conflicts of interest that might prevent the firm from offering any of its remaining
services to that corporation, assuming the defendant were still interested in hiring a
firm that had sued it.
These are some of the reasons why legal representation of plaintiffs in
class actions has remained distinct from traditional law practice. And, while still
true for securities and transactional litigation, the plaintiff side of the business has
recently begun to more closely resemble the traditional litigation model.
Historically, securities class actions were litigated with individual investor lead
plaintiffs, prompting famed plaintiffs’ lawyer and convicted felon, Bill Lerach, to
quip: “I have the greatest practice in the world. I have no clients.”282 Lawyers
brought cases and handpicked their clients. 283 Only with passage of the PSLRA did
institutional investors assume a commanding role in these actions. 284 A specific
goal of these reforms was to make plaintiff-side representation more closely
resemble traditional legal representation. In this respect, the lead-plaintiff and leadcounsel reforms of the PSLRA succeeded by empowering institutional clients to
select counsel, negotiate legal fees, and monitor law firm performance.285 These
279.
Examples of such firms that do not take plaintiffs’ cases are: DLA PIPER,
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014); BAKER & MCKENZIE,
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/
(last
visited
Oct.
15,
2014);
SKADDEN
http://www.skadden.com/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
280.
E.g., Corporate, SKADDEN, http://www.skadden.com/practice/corporate
(describing Skadden’s corporate practices); Litigation, SKADDEN, http://www.
skadden.com/practice/litigation (describing Skadden’s litigation practice).
281.
Intercorporate litigation rarely involves claims against individual corporate
defendants, unlike securities and transactional class actions.
282.
James R. Copland, Pension Politics Foils Curbs on Shareholder Strike Suits,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (Sept. 23, 2004),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=6014#.VD70Hq3wvIU (quoting
Bill Lerach).
283.
Coffee, supra note 94, at 411 (“[T]he plaintiff’s attorney can behave less as
an agent serving a principal and more as an independent entrepreneur, one who in fact often
hired the client.”).
284.
See supra notes 96–97, and accompanying text; Webber, Private Policing,
supra note 95, at 911.
285.
See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95; Heck, supra note 97, at 1204
(“Both the structure of the PSLRA and its legislative history show that Congress designed it
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reforms only partially transformed these cases, in part because most cases still
proceed with an individual lead plaintiff, and in part because the cases may still be
lawyer-driven—albeit with greater and more informed client input when led by
institutional plaintiffs.286 But the PSLRA did not transform (and was not intended
to transform) the underlying contingency-fee-based economic model for plaintiffs’
firms. Many of the dominant pre-PSLRA plaintiffs’ firms remained dominant postreform, and for straightforward reasons: they had the most expertise and
experience to litigate such cases.287 They continued operating on the pre-PSLRA
compensation model. In theory, plaintiffs’ law firms could collect billable-hour
compensation at the end of the case, paid out from settlement funds, but that would
fail to compensate the attorneys for the risk incurred in litigating a case with no
assurance of payment. The “lodestar method,” by which courts check the
plaintiffs’ firms’ requested legal fee by breaking it down into an hourly wage plus
a multiplier for risk, is one way that courts, in effect, translate the plaintiffs’
lawyers’ fee into the more familiar billable hour in order to assess the fee’s
appropriateness.288 Even under the status quo, these lawyers bill their time, and are
overseen by institutional clients that can actually pay their bills directly. Still, the
contingency fee reigns, as it should, when there are a large number of negativevalue claimants.
Loss of the class action poses two potential threats to the class action
plaintiffs’ bar: it might render plaintiff-side shareholder litigation economically
unviable, and to the extent that it remains viable, it could attract new competitors.
It is also possible, that loss of the class action could leave the field to meritorious,
high-dollar arbitration with generous legal fees led by the same firms that currently
dominate securities class action practice, while eliminating many of the firms that
specialize in nuisance suits. I entertain each of these possibilities in the ensuing
Sections.
B. Loss of the Class Action Eliminates Shareholder Litigation and, by
Extension, the Plaintiffs’ Bar
There are several ways that the elimination of the class action would lead
to the elimination of a separate plaintiffs’ bar. Some of these have already been
noted. Overall damages claims could fall far enough to sharply reduce legal fees.
Likewise, there could be a dearth of institutional investors with positive-value
claims, particularly if plaintiff-pays provisions are not eliminated by the Delaware
legislature, or halted by opposition from ISS.289 Without claims or clients, the
to achieve two interrelated objectives: (1) to encourage institutional investors to become
lead plaintiffs and (2) to reduce the amount of control attorneys wielded over securities
fraud litigation.”).
286.
See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95; Perino, supra note 95.
287.
See Coffee, supra note 94, at 420 (noting that after the PSLRA “the
plaintiff’s bar learned to develop relationships with public pension funds, unions and other
organizations that held large stock positions” in an effort to represent lead plaintiffs).
288.
Alexander, supra note 278 (describing the lodestar method).
289.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text regarding plaintiffs-pay or loserpays provisions.
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plaintiffs’ bar would disappear. Fund trustees and investment staffs might resist the
amount of time, effort, and expertise that go into monitoring lawyers in litigation.
This would be particularly true if the only successful business model would require
a shift from a contingency to an hourly fee, with the institution writing monthly
checks for substantial legal fees.
Further, even if there were a sufficient number of positive-value
claimants, loss of the class action would still pose significant challenges to the
traditional plaintiffs’ bar. Rather than facing an early, decisive skirmish for control
over the class action at the lead-plaintiff/lead-counsel selection stage, multiple
firms might find themselves representing institutional clients in multiple
arbitration proceedings over the same set of facts. For example, rather than be
appointed lead counsel or co-lead counsel for the Enron securities class action,
several firms would represent institutions in multiple arbitrations against Enron, its
accountants, and its underwriters. This poses some risk that the available legal fees
would be spread too thinly among a set of firms, rendering unviable the traditional
model—particularly contingency-fee-based compensation. Economic theory might
predict that a few firms would win this tournament—those with the strongest
relationships with institutional investors and, hopefully, the best litigation track
records. Because overall damages claims necessarily drop without the class action,
much of the economic viability of shareholder arbitration would depend upon the
ability of plaintiffs’ firms to recover a far higher percentage of claimed damages
than they do currently. As noted, some of the results for institutional opt-outs
suggest that sharply higher recoveries might be possible,290 although these opt-outs
had the benefit of being able to rely on the work done in the class action.
In sum, loss of the class action could translate into only a small number of
shareholder litigations or arbitrations on behalf of institutional investors, with
cases being too infrequent to support a law firm or practice devoted exclusively to
the field. Decline of the relevant plaintiffs’ bar may be one goal of mandatoryarbitration and fee-shifting provisions. Legal reforms have led to a decline in
plaintiffs’ bars that were once active in other fields. Some academic and popular
sources have suggested that the recent increase in patent litigation might be due to
state-level tort reform, which they argue has substantially limited profits for
plaintiffs’ law firms, possibly leading them to seek out alternative fields like patent
litigation.291 One might ask where plaintiffs’ law firms might turn if they can no
longer bring shareholder class actions. One potential candidate might be ERISA
litigation, under which plaintiffs have statutory rights and the potential defendants
are trustees, operating under trust law, and therefore may face legal barriers to
290.
See, e.g., Catherine Fredenburgh, With Billions at Stake, Class Action
Plaintiffs
Opt
Out,
Law
360
(Feb.
10,
2006,
12:00
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/5295/with-billions-at-stake-class-action-plaintiffs-opt-out
(“While the class action case netted a $651 million settlement, a judge ordered WorldCom
to pay $78.9 million in damages to the five pension funds . . . .”).
291.
See, e.g., Ronen Avraham and John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another
Unexpected
Effect
of
Tort
Reform,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878966; Julie Creswell, So Small a
Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 24, 2006, at B1.
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adopting mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting procedures against their own
beneficiaries.292
C. Loss of the Class Action Leads to Replacement of Contingency Billing with
the Billable Hour, and Potentially New Competitors
It is also possible that sufficient positive-value claims will exist to justify
the ongoing existence of shareholder litigation without class actions, but that
immense payoffs in the form of high legal fees in class actions that settle for
billions of dollars will disappear. And even if substantial legal fees could be
cobbled together across a dozen or more arbitrations, the cost of litigating those
could still be higher than litigating one class action; even if each individual
arbitration is less costly than a class action. Should such large payoffs cease to
exist, or should the cost of litigating numerous arbitrations exceed the costs of one
class action for the lawyers, then the contingency-fee model might no longer be
viable. The risk-reward calculation could be altered. Here, a billable-hour model
might become more viable, or at least a blended model involving some billable
hours and an outcome-dependent bonus. The potential rise of a billable-hour model
and a client base that consists exclusively of institutional investors raises the
possibility of new entrants into the field, assuming, again, that there are sufficient
positive-value claims to support it.
It is true that a billable-hour model would not eliminate the marketing
challenges and conflicts of interest generated by suing the kinds of large corporate
defendants that are, and would be, targeted in shareholder arbitration. But for
reasons previously described, many large institutional investors that collect their
pro rata share of settled class actions, but never participate as lead plaintiffs—like
mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, hedge funds, and others—could be
forced into more costly portfolio monitoring than they currently undertake, and
even litigation, over positive-value claims. As fiduciaries, they face potential
liability to their clients, customers, and shareholders if they fail to litigate potential
fraud claims or cannot show that they were aware of the fraud and made a
reasonable and conscious decision not to litigate it. 293 Many of the same outside
counsel that serve multinational corporate defendants in shareholder litigation also
serve large institutional investor clients that could have positive-value claims.
These law firms might then be forced to choose: help their clients monitor and
litigate such claims, or send that business out of the firm; perhaps to a competitor
or a satellite firm. One can imagine that traditional law firms might opt to keep this
business. Representing large institutions in litigation or arbitration against other
large institutions is what these firms do already, and it fits better with their
marketing goals than class actions do. Such institutional clients may very well
employ former associates of the law firms. Social-network effects, a converging

292.
See supra notes 189–195 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA
fiduciary duty, and the beneficiary’s right to sue for breach).
293.
See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 324,
338 n.18 (D.N.J. 1998); Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 1037
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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compensation model, and eased marketing challenges make it conceivable that
traditional plaintiff-side shareholder litigation and arbitration could be absorbed
into traditional defense firms as part of their securities and transactional practices.
Another alternative is that this work could also be absorbed by ERISA
and labor law firms that currently serve public-pension- and labor-union-fund
clients, although this would require acquisition of completely new skill sets and
practice areas by these firms.
D. Loss of the Class Action—A New Normal for Leading Plaintiffs’ Law Firms
Finally, it remains possible that the loss of the class action will eliminate
plaintiffs’ firms that bring nuisance suits, while allowing top firms with
institutional clients to continue practicing their trade in a new, but still somewhat
familiar, litigation environment. Currently, nuisance firms bring cases with
individual investor lead plaintiffs, mostly because they cannot find an institution
that is interested enough in litigating the case. These firms survive by bringing
cases no one else is interested in bringing, or by finagling their way onto lead
counsel teams in substantial cases run by top firms, often by threatening to object
to the settlement.294 Results for shareholders in cases brought by such firms are
almost always disappointing.295 Some of the law firms that bring such cases have
even been openly criticized on the record by judges. For example, in Revlon, Vice
Chancellor Laster heavily criticized the original class counsel before finding that
they failed to adequately represent the plaintiff–shareholder class and thus should
be replaced.296 The class action enables nuisance firms to continue to bring suit
without any screening by a sophisticated, motivated lead plaintiff. They must
simply identify one individual investor who is willing to serve as a lead plaintiff,
and file a class action on his or her behalf. Without the class action device,
nuisance firms would have to secure representation of an institutional investor with
a positive-value claim, something that might be difficult to do if the firms have an
established track record of poor performance.
Yet there is a small set of plaintiffs’ firms that regularly appear at the top
of rankings like the Legal 500 and Securities Class Action Services. 297 These firms
earn significantly higher fees in shareholder and transactional litigation,
presumably because they obtain better results for shareholders.298 These same
firms provide portfolio-monitoring services to their institutional investor clients,
whom they notify of exposure to claims, and on whose behalf they bring such
294.
See Webber & Badawi, supra note 270.
295.
Id.
296.
In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. March 16,
2010); see also Ann Woolner et al., When Merger Suits Enrich Only Lawyers, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-inwhile-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html (Laster critiqued plaintiff’s
attorneys for having “claimed undeserved credit for changes in the deal’s terms,
exaggerat[ing] the benefits of ‘tweaks’ and fail[ing] to notice red flags pointing to the
transaction’s unfairness”).
297.
See Webber & Badawi, supra note 270.
298.
Woolner, et al., supra note 296.
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claims.299 These relationships could persist in arbitration. Instead of notifying their
institutional clients when they have a large enough loss to obtain a lead-plaintiff
appointment, they could notify them of positive-value claims, and aid them in
deciding whether to proceed with such claims. Assuming that a significant number
of such claims can be identified and prosecuted, it is possible that the firms could
continue to exist without much change to their business models, including
continued pursuit of a contingency-fee-based compensation model. Plaintiff-pays
or loser-pays provisions make this less possible because plaintiffs’ lawyers might
be unwilling to bear the risk of having to pay defense-counsel fees, unless perhaps
the institutional clients are willing to engage in risk-sharing, or coalitions of
plaintiffs firms agree to bear the risks together.
Crucial to the ongoing success of such firms will not only be the question
of whether there are a sufficient number of positive-value claims, but whether
plaintiffs’ law firms will be able to substantially increase their recoveries as a
percentage of damages claimed over what they obtain in class actions today. There
are several reasons to believe that they might be able to do so, apart from the
aforementioned success of institutional investors in opt-out actions.300 Many of the
legal barriers erected against plaintiffs in the PSLRA and in a series of cases will
not directly apply in arbitration. Corporate defendants may be more willing to
settle on more favorable terms with large, well-connected institutional investors
that have personal relationships with boards and senior managers, carry weight in
the proxy proposal process and with shareholder voting, and could be sources of
future capital. The confidential nature of arbitration proceedings might further pry
open defendant purses, both because there will be less stigma to a high settlement
that, if it were public, might be interpreted as being tantamount to an admission of
liability, and because individual defendants can spend other people’s money, i.e.,
the corporate shareholder’s, to make the suit go away. 301 That’s true now, but at
least it’s public—it may not be in arbitration. It may also be that institutions
writing substantial monthly checks to their lawyers in these cases may monitor
those lawyers more closely and may themselves be more engaged in the litigation,
producing better results.

299.
See, e.g., Portfolio Monitoring, SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & WILLIS,
http://www.srkw-law.com/portfolio-monitoring.html (“Our complimentary, customized
portfolio monitoring service is designed to . . . provid[e] a ‘one-stop shop’ for securities
class actions and corporate governance matters globally . . . .”).
300.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the values received
by institutional investors after opting out of a class action and filing their own separate
claim).
301.
See Coffee, supra note 94 (noting that “recovery in securities class actions is
ultimately funded by the shareholders themselves . . . .”).
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V. FROM THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM TO THE SEMI-CIRCULARITY
PROBLEM, AND OTHER POLICY CONCERNS OF SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS
A. The Semi-Circularity Problem
Critics of the securities class action frequently point to the “circularity
problem.”302 Large, diversified, institutional shareholders still own the defendant
company they sue in these actions.303 Consequently, settling a securities class
action is tantamount to shareholders transferring money from their left pocket to
their right, minus attorneys’ fees.304 Such critics argue that shareholders would be
better off had they never filed suit at all. 305 Critics similarly argue that diversified
investors are as likely to benefit from fraud as they are to be harmed by it. 306 There
have been several critical responses to the circularity problem. Professor James
Park has argued that diversified investors benefit when there is less fraud in the
market overall, and has further argued that securities class actions are no more
circular than dividends, which also trigger transaction costs in the form of taxes,
while still playing an important signaling role.307 Diversified shareholders may still
benefit from bringing such actions to the extent they deter fraud in the market
generally, even if they do not profit from them in specific cases. Professor Jill
Fisch has argued that even if diversified investors do not benefit from the
securities class action, concentrated investors do, and are the ones deserving
protection.308 Concentrated investors make markets efficient. 309 Rather than aiming
to capture the overall market rate of return—minimizing firm-specific risk and
research costs—concentrated investors “seek alpha,” that is, they aim to beat the
302.
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 509 (1997); Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1194.
303.
Cox, supra note 302 (“The degree of circularity involved by such a
settlement depends primarily on what portion of the company is owned by the members of
the class action, a consideration that likely is dependent on the length over which the fraud
was committed, the relative turnover of the company’s shares, and the number of class
members who pursued a buy-and-hold-strategy versus an in-and-out-strategy.”).
304.
Coffee, supra note 94, at 409–410 (“Because most shareholders are
diversified and, over time, will fall into both groups, even meritorious securities class
actions may simply transfer wealth among diversified shareholders, thus producing neither
net compensation nor real deterrence. Worse yet, on each such wealth transfer among
shareholders, lawyers for both sides extract their fees . . . .”).
305.
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that a “fundamental problem” of filing securities class action is that “[a]s presently
constituted, securities class actions produce wealth transfers among shareholders that
neither compensate nor deter.”).
306.
Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1194.
307.
James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV.
323, 347 (2009).
308.
Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 346.
309.
See Webber, Plight, supra note 111, at 169.
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market.310 To do so, they incur substantial research costs and make concentrated
bets.311 These investors trade on public information, impounding it into stock
prices.312 These are the investors—and not necessarily the diversified investors—
that we want to protect from fraud. The ability to rely upon public statements made
by companies in the reporting context and outside it is necessary for concentrated
investors to continue to profit from their trading strategies. 313
Elimination of the securities class action replaces the circularity problem
with a semi-circularity problem, assuming any litigation continues. Instead of an
overlapping set of investors standing on both sides of the litigation as harmed
plaintiffs and as ongoing owners of the defendant, the plaintiff profile shifts. Only
investors with positive-value claims can sue and recover their damages. 314 Thus,
for the most part, this group will be composed of large institutional investors.
Conversely, many smaller institutional investors—and most, if not all, individual
investors—will have negative-value claims. Consequently, they will have no
remedy for their wrong. Yet they may very well remain invested in the defendant
company after the fraud.
Thus, if there is a fraud or a mispriced deal, positive-value claimants can
sue and recover, while negative-value claimants cannot. But the asymmetry runs
deeper than just who can and cannot sue. As ongoing owners of the defendant,
negative-value claimants still contribute their pro rata share of settlements obtained
by positive-value claimants in arbitration. So, negative-value claimants are not
only defrauded, but they must pay to compensate positive-value claimants for that
fraud. This is the semi-circularity problem.
In the most basic sense, this subsidy is unfair; it allows some investors to
be reimbursed for their losses by payments from other investors who incurred the
same losses. The subsidy also introduces a distortion in which the exact same trade
for the same sum would be actionable if made through a large institution, but not
through a small institution or an individual. A $5 million loss incurred by ten
different individual investors would not create economically viable claims,
whereas that same loss incurred by one institution would be economically viable.
Unless we have some reason to believe that it is always better to invest through
large institutions, loss of the class action needlessly introduces a distortion in the
marketplace. It gives large institutions an unmerited legal advantage over smaller
investors.
The subsidy, and the loss of any remedy for smaller investors, also cuts
against core, historical missions of securities regulation: the protection of
individual investors, and what we might call “level playing field values.”315
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
See Simard, supra note 191.
315.
See, e.g., S. Con. Rep., 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REC. S17965-03 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun) (stating that the PSLRA “was designed to
maintain strong investor protection”).
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Current and prior SEC chairpersons have made protecting individual investors a
priority.316 The protection of individual investors was one of the original animating
purposes of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. 317 It has remained
an important feature of securities regulation up until the present day. To illustrate
this, consider three cornerstones of government enforcement of the securities laws:
the disclosure rules, insider trading prosecutions, and Regulation Fair Disclosure
(“Regulation FD”).
Companies can issue securities to large, sophisticated institutional
investors under a variety of exemptions 318 that allow the companies to avoid the
most burdensome and costly disclosure rules because these investors are
sophisticated enough to “fend for themselves.”319 When selling to the investing
public as a whole, companies must disclose more than when selling under an
exemption.320 It follows that the investing public, which includes individual
investors and smaller institutional investors, should have actual remedies for
violations of the very rules of heightened disclosure that are designed to protect
them in the first place. Here, loss of the class action deprives these investors of a
remedy—particularly in the set of cases where we see only class actions, rather
than SEC actions.321 In short, loss of the class action provides a litigation subsidy
to funds that are the most capable of protecting themselves, while denying a
remedy to those whom the rules are designed to protect.
Insider trading takes place when either corporate insiders trade on
material nonpublic information, or when corporate outsiders who have
misappropriated information in breach of a fiduciary duty trade on that
information.322 The direct economic harms of such trading may sometimes be
trivial, but their direct economic harm is often not what motivates insider-trading
enforcement. These cases are brought to maintain the public perception, and
hopefully the reality, that investors trade on a level playing field, or something

316.
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address Before the U.S. House
Committee on Financial Services: Improving Financial Disclosure for Individual Investors
(May 3, 2006) (“[A]n overall strategy to make the individual investor – the average
American – the ultimate beneficiary of all that we do at the SEC.”); Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairwoman, SEC, Consumer Federation of America 21st Annual Financial Services
Conference: The Consumer in the Financial Services Revolution (Dec. 3, 2009) (stating that
she believes individual investors are the constituency to which the SEC must be most
attuned to providing protection).
317.
See Scott D. Museles, To Be or Note to Be a Security: Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 711, 711 (1991) (stating that one of the main goals of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to “instate investor
confidence in the markets”).
318.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2012).
319.
JAMES D. COX ET. AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 7,
268 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013).
320.
Id. at 249.
321.
See infra Part V.D.
322.
See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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approximating a level playing field.323 Ideally, markets should be able to rely on
publicly disclosed information. This allows value investors, or concentrated
investors, to weigh investment risks in making investment allocation decisions. 324
The perception that it is impossible to trade successfully without access to insider
information would undermine value investors from making trades, thereby
reducing the availability of capital and liquidity. 325 There is little point engaging in
research and investment calculations when you cannot trust the numbers.326 High
profile, insider-trading prosecutions are means of maintaining the perception that
investors, particularly individual investors, are not trading in a rigged game. 327
Similarly, the SEC recently adopted Regulation FD for fair disclosure.328
In the late 1990s, evidence emerged that corporate insiders were sharing material
nonpublic information, like earnings reports, with favored analysts and
institutional investors prior to disclosing such information via the formal reporting
process.329 Such disclosures did not violate insider-trading rules because the
information was not misappropriated, but was freely given, and the institutions
breached no duty in trading on that information. 330 But the SEC saw it as
problematic, and rightly so. “Investors who see a security’s price change
dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that
move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market

323.
James P. Jalil, Proposals for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall of the
House on Enron, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 689, 692–93 (“One such perspective that
endures to this day is that if confidence and trust are to be restored to the securities market,
the investing public must correctly perceive that the securities markets are indeed a level
playing field, and that investors privy to information not available to the investing public
will not use that information to gain an advantage.”).
324.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 259 (1988) (“[D]isclosure ... is
crucial to the way in which the federal securities laws function.... [T]he federal securities
laws are intended to put investors into a position from which they can help themselves by
relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to make.”) (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d. 462, 483) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
325.
See generally Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading
and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. OF ECON. 106 (1992).
326.
Id.
327.
See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Why Legalized Insider Trading Would Be
a Disaster, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 247 (2013).
328.
Anthony T. Horgan, Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective
Disclosure High Wire, 46 VILL. L. REV. 645, 646 (2001) (“The SEC adopted a scheme of
regulations, known as Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), to specifically address selective
disclosure, regarding the practice as abusive because of the unfair advantage bestowed upon
traders privy to the selectively disclosed information, and viewing its occurrence as
frequent.”).
329.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N RELEASE NOTICE, Release No. 33-7881, Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading (Aug. 15, 2000).
330.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (holding that there were no
insider-trading violations where the tippee did not misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information, did not wrongfully induce the information, and had no pre-existing fiduciary
duty to disclose to its shareholders).
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insiders.”331 The background section accompanying the announcement of
Regulation FD drew the connection between Regulation FD and insider trading
regulations: “Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to
ordinary ‘tipping’ and insider trading.332 In both cases, a privileged few gain an
informational edge—and the ability to use that edge to profit—from their superior
access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence.”333
The notion that investors make money through insider connections, rather than
investment skill, implicates more than just basic fairness concerns. The widespread
perception that one can only profit from trading with access to insiders would
rationally deter anyone without connections from investing and trading.
It seems unlikely that individual investors would immediately stop
trading if they lost their right to participate in class actions, although it would
create an additional incentive to shift their funds into institutional investors.
Whether this would be a positive development is not clear. Despite the widespread
perception that individual investors are “at best uninformed, at worst fools” there
is some evidence in the finance literature that a subset of such investors is
sophisticated and may outperform the market.334 Recent research has also
suggested that individual investors serve the market by improving share price
accuracy.335 It is true that there are already good reasons for individuals to stop
trading and invest through institutions, such as lower trading costs and improved
diversification tools.336 And while institutional investors have dramatically
increased their market share in recent decades, a substantial minority of the market
is still comprised of individual investors. 337 They might just incur more
unsubsidized losses, subsidize institutional losses, and invest in a market with less
deterrence.
Class action critics will point out, as I have already noted above, that
class action recoveries are so small as to be of negligible value to investors,
particularly individual investors. First, while that is true, that does not justify
making these investors even worse off than they are now by barring the little
331.
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N RELEASE NOTICE, supra note 329.
332.
Id.
333.
Id.
334.
Webber, Plight, supra note 111, at 178 (“Current financial scholarship
supports [the] notion that there are undiversified yet skilled individual investors who
outperform the market.”).
335.
Alicia J. Davis, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? Some
Preliminary Evidence 1 (Univ. Mich. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 07018, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998093 (“[C]ontrary to the received
wisdom, retail trading increases share price accuracy.” (emphasis omitted)).
336.
Cf. Erik R. Sirri, Trading Foreign Shares, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 315,
318 (2007) (“Demand has risen across the board (institutional and retail) as transactions
costs have fallen. Institutional trading costs appear to have declined by about 23 basis points
(roughly 5 cents per share) after the securities markets shifted in 2000 from trading in
fractions, to trading in pennies—an average monthly savings of about $133 million in
institutional trading costs.”).
337.
As of 2007, at least 26% of the public equities market was comprised of
individual investors. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, FACT BOOK 2007, 65 (2007).
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compensation they do receive and forcing them to subsidize the losses of large
institutions. But more importantly, if the goal is to get individual investors to stop
investing because it would be in their own interests to invest through institutions,
then perhaps we should consider outright banning individual trading—or at least
openly dissuading individuals from trading—rather than inducing them to shift to
institutions by continuously degrading their rights, undermining their ability to
assert them, and penalizing them for trading in the first place.
B. The End of Pro Rata Compensation as a Goal of Shareholder Litigation
Critics often mock the compensation rationale for securities class actions.
Recoveries as a percentage of damages claims have often been pitifully small, in
the single-digit percentage range.338 Judge Richard Posner argued almost 40 years
ago that the purpose of such actions was not compensation but deterrence, and
numerous other scholars have conceded that it is deterrence, and not
compensation, that matters in these actions.339 Securities fraud suffers from the
problem of asymmetric harms and rewards; a CEO who nets millions of dollars for
herself by inflating a firm’s revenues can cause billions of dollars in harm when
the truth is revealed.340 This asymmetry of harms and rewards makes adequate
compensation difficult to obtain.341 Still, as I noted earlier, in the past two decades,
courts and policymakers have not helped matters, by taking every opportunity to
reduce compensation in such actions by: (1) placing a ceiling on damages;342 (2)
eliminating aiding and abetting liability;343 (3) eliminating liability for fraud
participants who were nonspeakers;344 (4) denying discovery prior to a ruling on
the motion to dismiss;345 (5) instituting a higher pleading standard for scienter (the
338.
Patrick M. Garry et. al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action
Lawsuits: A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D.L. REV. 275, 299 n. 176 (2004) (stating that
settlement recovery of any shareholder class action was around eight percent of investor
losses).
339.
RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 398 (3d Ed. 1988); see
also Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Practice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 720 (1992).
340.
See Ella Mae Matsumura & Jae Yong Shin, Corporate Governance Reform
and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Conseuqences, 62 J. OF BUS. ETHICS
101, 106 (2005) (“Moreover, self-serving CEOs opportunistically time good or bad news to
maximize the value of stock options . . . there exists evidence suggesting that some CEOs
attempt to maximize their wealth with stock prices boosted by accounting earnings,
sometimes fraudulently.”).
341.
See generally id. (discussing various corporate governance to address
adequate forms of compensating CEOs).
342.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012).
343.
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
344.
Stonebridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008)
(finding respondents not liable to petitioner because respondents’ deceptive acts were not
relied upon by petitioners); Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct.
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highest pleading standard in civil procedure);346 (6) narrowing the scope of
causation;347 (7) barring the litigation of securities cases by classes of 50 or more
people in state court;348 and (8) allowing defendants to contest the efficiency of the
market for purposes of fraud-on-the-market theory.349 Some academics have
argued that compensation still plays an important role, that it reduces agency costs,
and also serves a loss spreading function. 350
As discussed above, institutional investors might see their compensation
improve in arbitration. Thus, loss of the class action does not so much put an end
to the concept of compensation itself, as it puts an end to the idea that investors
should be compensated proportionally to their losses. This departs from the
traditional securities regulation goals of individual investor protection and “level
playing field values” discussed above.351
The loss of small compensation for individual investors might be
outweighed by the benefits of institutional investor arbitration of shareholder
claims. This would be particularly true if arbitration were to preserve or even
enhance a deterrence function for private rights of action. Institutional investors
with real losses may engage in appropriate case selection, bring meritorious cases,
and vigorously litigate those cases. They might even improve the compensation
they obtain in such actions over what they get now in class actions, although as
noted, compensation for negative-value claimants will disappear altogether. It is
also possible that institutional investors will demand, as a condition for settling an
arbitration, that individually culpable defendants make personal payments towards
the settlement. This has occurred on occasion, most notably in the WorldCom
settlement.352 In most instances, the benefits of private rights of action will inure
primarily to institutions, if the class action ceases to exist. Individuals might still
benefit from whatever deterrence institutions are able to obtain from arbitrating
their claims. But that will likely only be true for the very largest defendants. As I
discuss in the next Section, loss of the class action may eliminate any deterrent or
compensatory tools for smaller actions. These losses will tend to
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Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
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than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
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347.
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348.
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350.
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Implications of Demands for Personal Contributions to Securities
Settlements by Defendant D&O’s, DUANE MORRIS 1, 1 (Jan. 25, 2005),
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disproportionately harm individual investors, who are less diversified and therefore
less able to withstand them.

CONCLUSION
Collective prosecution of securities-fraud and transactional claims has
faced repeated threats in the past two decades. These threats have offered frequent
opportunities for academics and practitioners to debate the merits of such actions
and how they measure up to their deterrent and compensatory goals. These
debates, in turn, have filtered back into the legislative and judicial arenas. The
most recent, and potent threat, to shareholder and transactional class actions has
emerged from a combination of recent Supreme Court cases like Concepcion,
American Express, and Animal Feeds, along with Delaware cases like
Boilermakers and ATP. These cases have opened the door to unilateral board
adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions requiring bilateral arbitration of
nonconsolidated, individual shareholder claims against the company. ATP has
permitted plaintiff-pays provisions that might render contingency-fee
arrangements too risky, though the Delaware legislature is currently considering
legislation to overrule the case. Dozens of companies have already adopted such
provisions, which may effectively eliminate the shareholder class action or other
means of collectively pursuing shareholder claims, or at least cause a substantial
restructuring of the plaintiffs’ bar.
This Article contributes to two decades of debate about shareholder class
actions by describing what shareholder claims would look like without the class
action device. I demonstrate that loss of the class action would eliminate most, if
not all, negative-value claims, thereby eliminating any remedy for substantial
investor losses. Further, I show that certain types of remedies would cease to be
pursued without class action litigation. Specifically even positive-value claimants
would no longer pursue remedies such as corporate governance reform and
disclosure-only or amendment settlements. The value of these remedies,
particularly disclosure-only lawsuits, may be so marginal or even negative that
their loss would not be missed. I point out that, without the class action, most
transactional litigation would disappear, and would shift into appraisal arbitration,
if it were to persist in any form. I argue that loss of the class action would
eliminate a layer of legal insulation for fiduciaries of large institutional investors
with positive-value claims. Such institutions might see increases to their
monitoring and litigation costs, and perhaps their recoveries too, while potentially
coercing them into bringing actions they might otherwise prefer not to bring. I
offer some suggestive evidence tending to show that there will be at least a subset
of institutions that will have large enough claims to maintain the viability of some
form of shareholder litigation or arbitration without class actions. I also raise the
possibility that overall damages might not drop as much as anticipated, even as
overall damages claims do, because institutions with positive-value claims might
be able to recover more in arbitration than they do today in class actions. The logic
of fee-shifting provisions plays out somewhat differently, substantially increasing
the costs to plaintiffs, placing great and perhaps unbearable strain on plaintiffs’
law firms, and deterring all but the most obviously meritorious lawsuits. I show
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that the bizarre insurance landscape for public-pension funds, currently the most
active lead plaintiffs in shareholder class actions, may make them more inclined
than not to pursue marginally positive-value claims, particularly in the face of
mandatory arbitration, and to engage in herding behavior around claims activity. I
assess the range of possible effects that loss of the class action will likely have on
the plaintiffs’ bar, from elimination of plaintiffs’ firms, to new competition from
traditional law firms, to thriving practices for a small set of firms with established
relationships to institutional clients. While loss of the class action could prompt
enhanced public enforcement via the SEC and other regulatory bodies, resource
constraints suggest that public actors may be limited in their ability to fill the
void.353
Finally, I assess how loss of the class action would clash with traditional
policy goals of securities regulation, particularly its preoccupation with
maintaining a level playing field for investors and protecting individual investors. I
show that loss of the class action would create a “semi-circularity problem” where
individual and other small investors not only are barred from recovering their
losses, but are further burdened by having to subsidize the losses of institutional
plaintiffs pursuing positive-value claims against companies still owned by
individual and small institutional investors. This semi-circularity problem creates a
distortion favoring large institutional investors at the expense of smaller
institutions and individuals, although smaller investors might still benefit from any
deterrence obtained by larger institutions bringing their own actions. I illustrate
how loss of the class action is tantamount to abandonment of one traditional goal
of shareholder litigation—compensation for injuries incurred—a goal that has been
much maligned in recent years and may mostly matter insofar as it creates the
aforementioned distortion. And I demonstrate that loss of the class action will
eliminate any remedy for fraud or other corporate wrongdoing committed by
smaller firms that today are targeted by class actions alone, and not the SEC.
These points demonstrate that loss of the class action would mark a
dramatic change to shareholder rights, to shareholder regulation more generally,
and to the private attorney-general model that has served as a cornerstone of
securities enforcement policy for decades. Some may welcome these
developments, while others condemn them. There is enough uncertainty, enough
flexibility in any fair-minded person’s assessment of the costs and benefits of such
a momentous change, for reasonable people to disagree about its soundness. But
there is substantial evidence that at least a subset of existing class actions are
meritorious and value enhancing, that top firms and institutional lead plaintiffs,
particularly public-pension funds, correlate with better outcomes for
353.
See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 11, 40 (U of Mich. Law & Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12-022, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2109739 (finding that median market capitalization for defendant
firms in cases targeted by class actions alone ($765 million) is substantially smaller than
median market capitalization in cases pursued by the SEC alone ($1.35 billion) or by both
the SEC and class actions ($1.39 billion)). Choi and Pritchard conclude that the resourceconstrained SEC avoids smaller cases.
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shareholders.354 An optimal reform to shareholder litigation would offer flexibility
and nuance, allowing preservation of meritorious, value-enhancing actions while
eliminating frivolous ones. It is true that there is some reason to believe that
arbitration could at least preserve some of these actions for large institutional
investors, and that those actions might have some advantages over class actions,
while also retaining some of the disadvantages noted above. Fee shifting may
eliminate claims by all but the least risk-averse investor. Perhaps the Delaware
legislature will attempt to place the fee-shifting genie back in its jar; opposition
from ISS might also prevent the widespread adoption of these provisions. Overall,
the prospect for nuanced legislative action seems dim, both because of institutional
barriers to legislative reform and the current dysfunctional state of Congress. In the
final analysis, the fate of the shareholder class action may be decided by the same
corporate boards of directors who are the defendants in these suits, and who bear
the state law fiduciary duties and the securities law obligations that these actions
are designed to enforce.

354.
Cheng et al., supra note 232; Perino, supra note 95; Webber, Private
Policing, supra note 95; Webber & Badawi, supra note 270; Badawi & Chen, supra note
274; Badawi, supra note 99; Krishnan et al., supra note 267.

